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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that with the federal
adoption of statutory rules of evidence in 1975, the common law rule for determin-
ing admissibility of scientific testimony was superseded, and that thenceforth ad-
missibility of scientific testimony was to be determined solely by Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 (Rule 702). 1 At the time, Rule 702 read as follows:
Testimony by Experts-If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.2
The Frye standard 3 had been adopted in one form or another by most of the
federal circuits and by many of the state courts during the 70 years preceding
Daubert. 4 Referred to as the "general acceptance" standard, the Frye standard-
although adopted in a variety of forms-had the core requirement that proffered
scientific testimony be based on something enjoying "general acceptance" among
some set of scientists. 5 It was an effort to ensure that expert testimony had some
measure of reliability. The Daubert Court, in agreement with Petitioners and with
the authors of six of the twenty-two amicus briefs6 that had been filed, held that
the strictness of the Frye "general acceptance" requirement was not in keeping
* Of counsel, Bohan, Mathers & Associates. B.S. Physics 1960 University of Chicago;
Ph.D. Physics 1968 University of Illinois-Urbana; J.D. 1980 Franklin Pierce Law Center. Mem-
ber of Maine and Massachusetts bars since 1980, as well as licensed to practice before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office since 1980.
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1993).
2. In 2001, Rule 702 was amended to incorporate the gloss put on it by Daubert, now reading:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if(l) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added).
3. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Kilgus, 571 F2d 508, 510 (9th. Cir. 1978); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th. Cir.
1975).
5. Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013 at 1014. The Frye court required that the "scientific
principle or discovery" on which the testimony was to be based be "sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
6. Of the rest, fourteen supported Respondent Merrell Dow, arguing in part for a stricter
standard for scientific evidence or for the retention of the Frye standard, and two supported
neither party.
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with the goal of the Federal Rules of Evidence to liberalize admission criteria.
7 If
the Court had stopped there, Daubert would be tantamount to the Maine scientific
evidence rule, as set out in State v. Williams.8 But it did not stop there. Instead,
engaging in what some might characterize as an exegesis, the Court asserted that
since inaccurate expert testimony could not "determine a fact in issue," it was
necessary for the trial judge to exclude expert testimony not based on the scientific
method.9 The Court thereby brought in through the back door the same reliability
concern that had led to the widespread adoption of Frye in the first place. This
author asserts that, contrary to popular legal and lay belief, the significance of
Daubert lies not in its discarding of Frye and its emphasis on Rule 702, but rather
in its exhorting of trial judges to exercise their "gatekeeper" role with respect to
scientific evidence, something that many had been fairly lax about previously.
It is precisely because trial judges have taken this gatekeeper role more seri-
ously than in the past that a revolution is occurring in scientific evidence and fo-
rensic science. Adding to the pressure for reexamination and change has been the
plethora of DNA-based wrongful-conviction discoveries of the past decade. Men
convicted of the most heinous crimes, and often sentenced to death, have subse-
quently been found indisputably innocent of those crimes. 10
Just as an autopsy provides a post-mortem check of a physician's cause-of-
death finding and/or an earlier diagnosis of disease, the post-conviction DNA analy-
sis can provide a check on the correctness of a verdict or plea. 11 Of course, there
is less symmetry in the legal selection process than there is in the medical. Al-
though autopsies are generally sought whenever there is uncertainty in the diagno-
sis or cause of death, post-conviction DNA reviews are sought only to prove that
the guilty verdict was mistaken, that it represented a "false positive." No one
seeks such reviews to support a verdict of innocence. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that a prosecutor would ever seek such a review to support a verdict (or plea) of
guilty.
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 588-90.
8. 388 A.2d 500, 503-04 (Me. 1978).
9. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 590-91.
10. Urging this revolution on is the continuing revelation of wrongful convictions-with a
total number yet unknown, but 138 at the latest count maintained by The Innocence Project at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law-involving the most heinous crimes, which resulted in
people being incarcerated for decades, often under sentence of death. The Innocence Project, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Aug. 26, 2003). In September 2003, Calvin Willis
was the most recent prisoner to be freed, after serving twenty-two years of a life-without-parole
sentence in a Louisiana prison, wrongly convicted of raping a young child. Keri Kirby. If it
Weren't for DNA, I'd Still be Sitting in Angola, SHREVEPOR" TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at Al. An
earlier exoneration is described by the Center on Wrongful Convictions of the Northwestern
University School of Law. There, a man was freed in mid-1999 after serving fourteen years
under sentence of death for a rape and murder that DNA analysis showed was committed by
someone else. Center on Wrongful Convictions, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/
wrongful/exonerations/jones.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). See also Steve Mills and Ken
Armstrong, Yet Another Death Row Inmate Cleared, Cm. TRm. May 18, 1999 at 1.
11. For obvious reasons, post-conviction DNA tests are only useful in a small number of
cases. In addition to being limited to situations where DNA from the crime scene was collected
and preserved, there has to be a logical nexus between the possible outcome of the analysis and
the guilt of the person charged. Typically, post-conviction DNA tests are relevant in crimes
involving rape.
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Once the wrongful-conviction findings began to surface, there was great in-
terest in investigating what had gone wrong at the underlying trials. It was real-
ized that, in addition to answering the pressing specific question, the results of
such an investigation might have significance for criminal trials in general, regard-
less of the crime charged, and for civil trials. Presumably, errors that were occur-
ring in trials that could be checked with DNA analysis were also occurring in trials
for which DNA analysis was not available. 12
The most common threads running through the trials that led to wrongful con-
victions are a paucity of evidence and the failure of the defense to put on a forensic
expert. 13 In many of the cases, there was no physical evidence at all and the
prosecution's case rested entirely on eye witness testimony, sometimes from a single
witness. 14 The forensic science community was most dismayed by those cases
where the wrongful verdict was based on specious forensic testimony. In most
instances, the testimony involved exaggerating, either through implication or di-
rect lying, the significance of those tests that had been done. A typical example
would involve the claim that hairs can be "individualized" by microscopic exami-
nation, leading to the conclusion that specimens of the defendant's hair had been
found at the crime scene. Although the falsity of such statements has long been
recognized in professional scientific literature, it seems not to be recognized by
the majority of the public. 15 This means that, in the absence of effective opposi-
tion, a jury will probably accept the false testimony at face value and as persuasive
evidence. Even if the witness only makes a literally true statement that the hair
specimen found at the scene "is consistent with" being the defendant's, a jury and
judge not familiar with this type of evidence, and not alert to the "is consistent
with" subterfuge, can be influenced to the severe detriment of the defendant. A
knowledgeable defense expert can help cure such testimony or even prevent it
from being offered in the first place. 16
Section II of this article will go into greater detail with Frye, and with the
entire Daubert trilogy, which includes, in addition to Daubert itself, GE v. Joiner,17
12. Arson cases are a prime example of this. Although forensic investigation techniques
underlying arson indictments are not going to be addressed in this article, it is worth noting that
long-accepted practices in that field are overdue for validation studies and Daubert reviews. It
is submitted that if wrongful convictions could be proved as definitively in arson cases as they
can in cases involving rape and/or murder, these reviews would have already occurred.
13. See Advancing Justice through Forensic DNA Technology: Oversight Hearing Before the
House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Peter Neufeld, The Innocence Project), available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/neufeld07l7O3.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003). See also The Inno-
cence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/index.php (last accessed Aug. 26, 2003).
14. According to the Innocence Project, supra note 10, more than two-thirds of the 138
wrongful convictions were based, at least in part, on mistaken eyewitness identification. Case
Profiles, The Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/index.php (last vis-
ited Aug. 26, 2003).
15. See, e.g., Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochon-
drial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCL 964 (2002), available at http://
aafs.micronexx.com/PDF/JOFS/JFS2001398-475/JFS2001398_475.pdf (last accessed Nov. 22,
2003).
16. Note that nuclear DNA from hair, if it can be extracted and analyzed, will serve to indi-
vidualize the hair's source. Even mitochondrial DNA will have a powerful limiting effect on
who the hair donor could have been, and an absolute effect on eliminating specific individuals.
Where hair is involved, the defining dichotomy is between DNA analysis and microscopic analy-
sis.
17. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,18 in order to present a non-orthodox, but per-
haps a clearer way of regarding these cases. Section II will also discuss the man-
ner in which the several states have reacted to Daubert. Many have followed it,
but many have rejected it and retained Frye. A few states have rejected both,
asserting that no reliability requirement should be imposed on expert testimony.
This article argues that, in spite of references to reliability in State v. Williams, and
contrary to lawyerly folk belief that Maine is a Daubert state, Maine in fact be-
longs to this last set of states, those that decided to "sit out the dance" or, depend-
ing on one's metaphorical preference, those marching to their own drummer(s). In
several of these states, (and Maine appears to be one of them) a deliberate choice
seems to have been made to maintain a liberal admission policy for scientific evi-
dence, either by expressly avoiding a reliability requirement, or by stating the reli-
ability requirement in such a manner that it is unlikely to be used to exclude evi-
dence.
Section HI will discuss specific types of forensic evidence, both from a scien-
tific point of view and a case law point of view. There are many types of tests used
in forensic investigations, including some that hang on in spite of having long
been recognized as bogus by the scientific community, and others that were once
considered valid but are now realized not to be. In addition, there are a number of
forensic techniques, including fingerprint and handwriting identification, that have
been used for years without having been tested for accuracy or reliability.19 It is
not clear which, if any, of these latter techniques will ultimately be found to fail the
Daubert test for reliability. What is clear is that this last set of techniques has
given rise to the greatest amount of Daubert-induced rancor. In some cases, such
as with latent fingerprint identifications, the present practitioners have taken up a
very defensive stance, either claiming that no validation tests need be done or that
they have already been done decades ago. In contrast, practitioners of other tech-
niques said to be unsupported by validation tests have been cooperative and open
in developing both general validation tests and individual proficiency tests. The
forensic techniques and devices selected for more detailed discussion in Section
III are: (a) polygraph; (b) latent fingerprint identification; (c) "voiceprints"; (d)
handwriting identification; and (e) bullet "fingerprinting" by trace element analy-
sis.
Section IV will be a polemic, arguing that: (1) the Daubert standard regarding
expert testimony reduces essentially to that of "general acceptance within the sci-
entific community," one of the versions of the Frye standard; (2) determining
whether the scientific community as a whole accepts a theory or technique is readily
knowable and does not involve "counting heads"; (3) for the admission of testi-
mony that is ostensibly scientific into evidence, there should be a reliability re-
quirement and the requirement should be articulated in such a way that its applica-
tion can be evaluated by an independent observer; 20 (4) Maine lacks such a stan-
18. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
19. More carefully stated, it has been realized that these techniques have not been validation-
tested in a manner that can be evaluated by disinterested observers who are able to evaluate the
statistics and other goodness measures of the validation tests.
20. There must be enough structure to the reliability test that someone aggrieved by the
admission or exclusion of scientific testimony at trial has something on which to structure his or
her appellate argument. The present Daubert standard comes close to satisfying this require-
ment.
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dard; and (5) in trials of criminal cases, the defense must be required to engage a
forensic expert if the prosecution's case is based in any way on forensic testimony
or on evidence that can be evaluated by a forensic scientist.
II. THE FRYE AND DAUBERT STANDARDS, AND THE STANDARDS OF MAINE AND
OF THE OTHER FORTY-NINE STATES
A. Frye Standard2'
Mr. Frye was convicted of second-degree murder in the federal district court
for the District of Columbia after a trial in which his exculpatory lie detector 22
findings were not allowed into evidence. 23 This version of the lie detector just
measured a single physiological parameter, systolic blood pressure, and the asser-
tion of its inventor-operator was that the pattern of blood pressure variation al-
lowed him to determine whether the subject was being truthful.
Ironically, in terms of later developments, the trial court's stated grounds for
excluding the testimony was relevance; the test had been done ten days before trial
and therefore was not relevant to the truthfulness of Mr. Frye's trial testimony.24 It
was at the appellate level that the grounds for exclusion were stated in terms of the
quality of the evidence rather than its relevance. The D.C. Court of Appeals set
out, as the common law rule pertaining to expert witnesses, the following (which
is now familiar from Rule 702):
The [common law] rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are
admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that
inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judg-
ment upon it, for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science,
art, or trade as to require a previous habit or experience or study in it, in order to
acquire a knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie within the
range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experi-
ence or special knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particu-
lar science, art, or trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence. 25
Following directly on that statement, the court said
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. 26
21. It may be thought that a great deal of space is given to a standard that has been "super-
seded." The attention paid to Frye in this discussion is justified because of its continuing health
as the scientific evidence standard in many states. Furthermore, many consider its incorporation
into Daubert as the most important of the "Daubert factors." Indeed, this Author believes that
the "Daubert factors" collectively reduce to the single "general acceptance" factor for the ma-
jority of the types of scientific evidence sought to be introduced.
22. In this Article, the use of the term lie detector should not imply that it is accepted as a
descriptive label for polygraph.
23. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (App. D.C. 1923).
24. Id. at 1014. See infra Part III.A.
25. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 at 1014.
26. Id.
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Finally, the court applied this rule to the case before it, saying, "[wie think the
systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scien-
tific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would jus-
tify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, develop-
ment, and experiments thus far made."
27
It is important to note, in light of later complaints that the Frye standard cre-
ated too many uncertainties as to which branch of science was the "particular" one
that trial judges should look to, that the Frye court had anticipated a broad determi-
nation. Critics pointed out that when a narrow definition was used, more evidence
came in than when a broad definition was used.28 It is clear that at the outset it was
a broad consensus that was required. One can find an acceptance of physiology-
based lie detectors among the group that uses them or advocates their use. Some
of these people may have the credentials of scientists. However, there has not
been general acceptance of this type of lie detector among either the fields of physi-
ology or psychology, at least not within clinical psychology.
Also important to note in the Frye court's framing of the standard is the exact
meaning of the phrases used. The court is not saying that just because a form of
evidence has long been accepted it will continue to be accepted. The "thing" from
which a deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the scientific field in which it resides. It does not matter if the sub-
ject matter of the expert testimony has been repeatedly introduced into courts; it
shall be excluded if it does not have general scientific acceptance. This allows for
the conclusion that something, assumed to have general acceptance because it has
been around for a long time, in fact does not have acceptance, nor merit it. It also
allows the court to take notice that scientific acceptance has been withdrawn from
a "thing" that once had it.
Over the following seventy years, the Frye standard in various forms was
adopted by most federal and state jurisdictions in the United States.29 Although in
many cases, the adopting language implied that a narrow branch of science was to
be looked to for the "general acceptance" measure, 30 other courts were clear about
the breadth of the view. In some cases, it was the scientific community as a whole
that was to be the base, making the review broader than even the Frye court had
specified. 3 1 New York State, for example, continues to adhere to the version of
Frye that it expressly adopted in 1983 in People v. Hughes.32 A subsequent New
York decision, in accord with Hughes, stated that, "[w]hile foundation concerns
itself with the adequacy of the specific procedures used to generate the particular
evidence [sought] to be admitted, the test pursuant to [Frye] poses the more el-
emental question of whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed,
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 1197, 1208-09 (1980).
29. See supra note 4. See also infra note 72 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Mass. 1963) ("Judicial accep-
tance of a scientific theory or instrument can occur only when it follows a general acceptance by
the community of scientists involved.").
31. Note in the discussion of the polygraph, infra Part III.A, that the recent National Re-
search Council evaluation was done by a committee that included scientists outside of the fields
of physiology and psychology, including in particular statisticians.
32. 453 N.E.2d 484, 497 (N.Y. 1983).
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generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally."'33
The language in this ruling serves to answer those who assert that the major
criticism of Daubert is internally inconsistent. The alleged inconsistency lies in
claiming that most judges will be unable to recognize science when they see it,
while at the same time contending that the Frye "general acceptance" rule should
be the standard. How, they ask, can a judge, whose lack of scientific understand-
ing is the supposed problem, choose the correct group of scientists to look to in
applying the "general acceptance" test, or, for that matter how can such a judge
determine whether the chosen group consist of scientists in the first place. The
specter is raised of a judge looking for "general acceptance" within an insular and
secretive group of practitioners who are the only ones working with the technique
in question, for example the correlation of people's psyches with the moon phases,
or of the discerning of truth from the examination of donkey entrails. Scientists
outside the group would ridicule this "science," but since they are outside the group
deemed relevant, the judge, under Frye, would not be asking them. Indeed, with
borderline cases, the smaller the relevant group defined by the judge the more
likely the testimony would be admitted, and conversely, the broader the judge has
defined the group the less likely that it would be admitted.
The recognition that it is the broad scientific community that should be looked
to eliminates the problem of which "community" to choose. In addition, the state-
ment of the rule in terms of the techniques that were actually used cuts through the
formalistic objection that continues to be raised by those who question the broad
applicability of Frye to all scientific evidence. Critics point out that the Frye
standard refers to a generally accepted "doctrine or theory" underlying the testi-
mony, and ask where that leaves the technique that, though universally accepted, is
not yet explainable by any theory, let alone one accepted by a broad consensus of
scientists. However, it is clear from reading Frye that the "thing" from which the
deduction is made is not limited to a deep underlying principle, but can include the
technique itself. 34
Another criticism leveled at the Frye standard is that it requires judges to look
outside the law in order to determine whether expert testimony is admissible. In
the wake of his Structure of Scientific Revolutions,35 Thomas Kuhn received let-
ters from social scientists, historians and others not in the hard sciences informing
him that "paradigms" existed in their fields also. He noted that it was difficult to
respond to people who missed the point by such a wide margin.36 Unless the
33. People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y 1994).
34. For the decades before Bardeen, Cooper, and Shreiffer provided the now-universally
accepted BCS theory, the most common form of superconductivity (the phenomenon by which
an electrical conductor loses absolutely all resistance to current flowing through it), no one
could explain superconductivity. In other words, there was no "theory or doctrine" underlying
it. If the Frye standard required a generally accepted "theory or doctrine," it would appear that
testimony based on superconductivity would not have been allowed into evidence. Of course, in
reality, that paradox would be easily resolved by a trial judge governed by the original Frye
standard. The evidence would be admitted, and a slight adjustment would be made in the appli-
cation of the rule. In New York, that problem is resolved globally by making the technique itself
the element that has to have general scientific acceptance. See supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
35. THOMAS KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
36. THOMAS KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 208 (2d. Ed. 1969) ("I see what they
mean.., but their reaction has nevertheless puzzled me.").
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judge is willing to ignore the reliability of material, he or she must look to the field
from which it comes. One of the more unenlightened forms of Frye bashing is to
depict it as simply calling for a counting of heads within a subset of the scientific
community.37 Unlike a jury verdict, scientific consensus is not arrived at by a
vote. There must be reasons amenable to logical analysis set out when one states
why a theory or a result is wrong or doubtful. The reports generated by the Na-
tional Research Council give good examples of how the scientific community goes
about evaluating a theory, and these reports are written in language accessible to
everyone.38
In articulating their version of the Frye standard, some state courts recognized
that a determination of the reliability of scientific results requires three levels of
inquiry.39 For present purposes, these three levels can be labeled, respectively,
Frye I, Frye H, and Frye III. At the most fundamental level is the underlying
scientific doctrine; the Frye I question is whether that doctrine has general scien-
tific acceptance. As a practical matter, this is usually the least important inquiry,
though often the one given the most attention. Rarely, if ever, does the underlying
scientific doctrine lead directly to the scientific results that are sought to be intro-
duced into evidence. For example, every analysis dealing with the motion of ob-
jects and their interaction with one another is based on Newton's Theory of Mo-
tion, also referred to as Newton's Laws. However, it is specious to argue that
expert testimony should be admitted just because the witness asserts that it was
based on Newton's Laws. Thus, it is necessary to go to the Frye II level to deter-
mine whether the technique has general scientific acceptance.
A common but simple technique in accident reconstruction is to determine the
speed of a car at the start of its skid by measuring the distance it took to stop,
known as the skid-to-a-stop distance. It can be shown from Newton's Laws that in
order to calculate the speed, it is only necessary to measure the length of the skid
(DIST) and determine the coefficient of friction (COF) between the tires and the
pavement. Furthermore, there is general scientific acceptance of the fact that for a
given dry pavement surface the COF is the same for all over-the-road automobile
tires in use in the United States.4 0 Because of this acceptance, one can measure
COF with any car and assume that the result will apply to the car in question. One
expression for the needed relationship is:
V = [30xDISTxCOF]1/2
V is the speed of the car in mph at the start of the skid if DIST is stated in
feet.4 1 It can be shown from Newton's Equations that the same expression holds
37. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 1982).
38. See infra notes 92 and 187 for the National Research Council reports on polygraphs and
voiceprints, respectively.
39. See, e.g., Ex parte Perry, 586 So.2d 242 (Ala. 1991); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422
(Minn. 1989); House v. State, 445 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1984). Requiring two of the three levels of
inquiry were State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972) and State v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547
(N.H. 1969).
40. The range of tires on standard vehicles is such that the tire/road COF is the same for all
such cars on a given pavement, something that is not intuitively obvious.
41. If the expression giving the speed-from-skids is stated in a different unit system, it will
have a different appearance in terms of superficialities. However, if the expression is correctly
derived, it can be easily shown to be the same, physically, as the one given.
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for all cars, regardless of weight, suspension, or other specific design features.
The determination of speed using this equation and the assumption that the COF is
essentially the same for all car tires constitutes this particular technique, and is
universally accepted both among persons carrying out these measurements and by
objective scientists evaluating the technique. Thus, this technique satisfies Frye
II, and in fact is used in court hundreds of times a year.
The Frye III level of inquiry goes to how well the particular practitioner ap-
plied the technique. In the example above, this would relate to how well he or she
measured the skid distance and the COE Regardless of arguments about the com-
petence of the practitioner involved, one does not get into whether there would be
general acceptance of the particular application. That is considered when weigh-
ing the evidence and is generally dealt with on cross examination.
There is some confusion about what constitutes a novel technique. To con-
tinue with the example given above, if the pavement surface is wet, to the point
where there is a film of standing water, it is no longer true that the COF will be the
same for all tires. It will be much lower for bald tires, for example, than it will be
for tires containing the legally required 1/16" tread. There is not, therefore, gen-
eral acceptance of the technique as described above when there is water on the
pavement, and it would be an error for a trial court to accept the profferer's state-
ment that it was. If the court did accept the technique and equation at face value,
even though the road was wet at the time of the event under consideration, the
speed calculated for the skidding car could be significantly higher than its actual
speed if that car had had tires with little tread.
For another example from the arena of accident reconstruction, consider "speed
from yaw.' 42 This is a good example since it illustrates a technique that is ac-
cepted (given that certain conditions are satisfied), yet the theory underlying it is
not completely understood. It can be derived from Newton's Equations that the
maximum speed with which a car can round a curve of radius R (that is, an arc of a
circle with that radius) is:
VMA X = 3.86x[RxCOF] 1/2
VMAX is given in mph if R is given in feet. COF is still a measure of the
resistance needed to slide the car's tires on the pavement and, as such, is the same
for all cars on the particular pavement traversed by the car, again provided that the
pavement is dry. By saying that VMAX is the maximum speed is to say that at-
tempts to travel the trajectory at higher speed will be foiled; it simply cannot be
done. Now, to persons first encountering this expression, the most amazing thing
is that it does not depend at all on the make of the car or the weight of the car. This
was also true of the skid-to-a-stop relationship. However, it does not seem reason-
able that the maximum speed at which a car can round a curved path does not
depend on such factors as the suspension, the stiffness of the springs and so forth.
But it is true; the above expression is rooted very close to Newton's Equations,
with no intermediate steps. What is not yet understood, however, is why the speed
at which a car starts to sideslip when going around a curve of radius R is approxi-
mately equal to VMAX. Nothing in the theory as developed thus far explains why
42. See J. STANNARD BAKER & LYNN B. FRICKE, THE TRAFFiC-ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION MANUAL:
AT-SCENE INVESTIGATION AND TECHNICAL FOLLOW-UP 17-19 - 17-22 (1986).
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that is.43 Nevertheless, experimental tests carried out by both police and civilian
agencies have led to the general scientific acceptance of this technique for deter-
mining the speed that a car must have had when it was leaving cornering marks on
the pavement with a radius of curvature R. The key equation in which VMAX
gives the "critical speed" for a car rounding a curve of radius R when the COF has
the value stated is sometimes referred to as the "yaw formula" or the "critical
speed scuff formula."
On the other hand, when the yaw formula is used in an attempt to calculate
speed for a car that left a trace of its passage on something other than a hard sur-
face, the formula (that is, the technique) is not being used in a context that has been
generally accepted by the scientific community and, under Frye, the results should
be excluded from evidence. However, Maine has allowed the admission of such
evidence. 44
B. Daubert Standard
In the early 1990s, amidst expressions of dismay that nonsense was being
accepted as science in the courtrooms of the nation 45 and equally adamant protes-
tations that the Frye standard was so strict that it was unfairly keeping out per-
fectly valid scientific results, several cases-ultimately combined under the cap-
tionDaubert v. Merrell Dow 6 -were making their way to the U.S. Supreme Court
on a scientific evidence issue. Because this was the first time that the Supreme
Court was to address scientific evidence admissibility, many diverse interests, cut-
ting across political boundaries, submitted amici curiae briefs.47 Although many
of those submitting briefs are readily recognizable, others are not, and were prob-
ably ad hoc groups brought into existence to exercise an opportunity to be heard
by the Court. Briefs supporting the Petitioners in urging that "strict" Frye stan-
dard be struck down and that it be made easier to introduce novel scientific find-
ings into evidence were submitted by, among others, (a) The American Society of
Law, Medicine and Ethics, (b) the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA),
(c) Nicolaas Bloembergen, et al., 48 and (d) a collective of four states-Texas,
Montana, Idaho, and South Dakota. Briefs arguing either for the retention of the
Frye standard or for a stricter standard of admissibility were submitted by, among
others, (a) the American Insurance Association (AIA), (b) the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA), (c) the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science (AAAS) joined with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
(d) The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, (e) The American Tort Re-
form Association, (f) the United States government, submitted by the Office of
43. See, e.g., I FORENSIC AccIDENr INVESTIGATION 52 (T.L. Bohan & A.C. Damask, eds., Lexis-
Law, Supp. 2003) (making the somewhat hyperbolic analogy to the surprise one would have in
discovering that the energy emitted when an object of mass M burned in oxygen is equal to the
maximum energy theoretically available from the object, as given by the famous E = Mc2.
44. See State v. Irving, 2002 ME 31, 818 A.2d 204.
45. The catch phrase was "junk science," probably popularized by PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COUrROOM (1991), largely a propaganda tract biased toward large
defendants, the best part of which is its title.
46. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
47. Id. at 581.
48. This group characterized themselves as eighteen scientists, scholars, and teachers of
science.
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Solicitor General, (g) a consortium that may have included every medical associa-
tion in the United States, and (h) a group of scientists headed by Nicolaas
Bloembergen, most of whom were Nobel Prize laureates.
Finally, some organizations submitted "neutral" briefs including: (a) the
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government and (b) "A Group
of American Law Professors.' 49
The trial court granted summary judgment for Merrell Dow after using the
Frye standard to exclude the Plaintiff's key expert testimony.50 The United States
Supreme Court vacated summary judgment.5 1 The Court's opinion, prepared by
Justice Blackmun, was to some observers, especially those in the sciences, a call
for all judges to become scientists themselves, or at least to act as if they were
scientists in evaluating proffered scientific testimony. There was no longer an
absolute dependence on what the scientific community, however it was defined,
thought of the science that was being offered in court. Instead, courts were to
determine whether the testimony was based on the scientific method, placing their
emphasis on the method by which the results were said to have been obtained, and
minimizing the importance of those results themselves as a measure of reliabil-
ity.52
In summary, Daubert emphasized the primacy of Rule 702 in determining
whether expert scientific testimony was to be admitted, but also imposed a re-
quirement that the Court had inferred from Rule 702, namely, that the testimony be
reliable. 53 As guidance to the trial judges on whom it was placing the responsibil-
ity of gauging reliability, the Court listed some factors (including "general accep-
tance") that might be used to evaluate the evidence, while cautioning that no one
of these factors nor any particular combination of them was dispositive for the
reliability determination. 54 The implication was that the trial judge, after applying
various measures, would know scientific reliability when he or she saw it. There
are a number of ways of stating the Daubert factors. The following is a common
one, where the "technique" refers to the means by which the results sought to be
testified to were obtained:
49. In the Author's opinion, the AAAS/NAS brief urging the requirement of clearly articu-
lated high admission standards was far above the other briefs in its clarity and in the statement of
its arguments. Apparently, the Supreme Court was also impressed, since much of the text in the
opinion paraphrased or borrowed verbatim from this brief. See Brief of Amici Curiae American
Association for the Advancement of Science and National Academy of Sciences, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102). However, it can be argued that
the substance of the opinion fell far short of what the AAAS and NAS sought from the Court,
50. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 583-84.
51. Id. at 597-98.
52. As an aside, it should be said that this is not the way that scientists themselves decide
whether a new result is legitimate. Scientists, especially experimental scientists, realize that
mistakes can be made easily and that an individual experimentalist may be mistaken in his or her
belief about how the experiment was done. For this reason, it is the result as well as the stated
experimental method that is examined. If the result is sufficiently weird or otherwise unex-
pected, considerable time will go by before it is accepted, time during which others try to repli-
cate the experimental results. It is likely that Justice Blackmun was influenced by a statement in
the amicus brief filed by the Nobel laureates, which contains the observation, "[i]t is how the
conclusions are reached, not what the conclusions are, that makes them 'good science .... "
One wants to respond, "Yeah, but..."
53. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 504 U.S. at 594-95.
54. Id. at 592-94.
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(a) Is the technique testable and tested?
(b) Has there been publication and peer review of the technique?
(c) Is the rate of error obtained by the technique reasonable?
(d) Are there standards for applying the technique?
(e) Is there general scientific acceptance of the technique?55
Rule 702 applies to all expert opinion testimony and not just to scientific tes-
timony. The emphasis of Daubert on scientific testimony, however, led to wishful
thinking by many litigants that the strictures of Daubert did not apply to the type
of opinion testimony that they were going to rely on. Indeed, some appellate courts
supported this view,56 leading to such unseemly behavior as attorneys cautioning
their expert witnesses not to call what they did "science.' 57 It was not just attor-
neys, but also forensic scientists who were assured that Daubert would never ap-
ply to most of them because it was only concerned with "breakthrough" discover-
ies.58 Science was one thing. Experience was another. It was argued that Daubert
applied only to those trying to introduce evidence based on new scientific discov-
eries and techniques, not to scientists testifying about results produced by "normal
science, ' 59 and certainly not to engineers. 60 It appears that no one even specu-
lated that Daubert would apply to the opinions of physicians providing expert
testimony based on their medical experience, or to accountants, bankers, and
mapmakers giving expert testimony pursuant to Rule 702.
Any hope that Daubert could be narrowly applied was dashed by the Supreme
Court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.6 1 Like Daubert, Kumho Tire was watched
very carefully by those interested in expert testimony. The issue before the Court
was whether Rule 702 guidelines and exhortations of Daubert were limited to
scientific testimony, or whether they also applied to engineering testimony, par-
ticularly engineering testimony based solely on the professional experience of the
expert witness.62 Arnicus curiae briefs were filed, including a major one on behalf
of engineers arguing that engineering was different from science and therefore
should not be held to the formal reliability standards of Daubert.63 The opinion in
Kumho Tire, though consistent with the breadth of Rule 702, was surprisingly broad,
holding that all expert opinion testimony governed by Rule 702 was also governed
55. Id. at 592-95.
56. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
57. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) received more than fifty proposals
immediately following Daubert asking that references to the "scientific method" be removed
from NFPA 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigation. Private communication with John
Lentini, Principal Member of NFPA Technical Committee on Fire Investigation (July 2003).
58. At the Plenary Session of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Foren-
sic Sciences (AAFS), former AAFS President Cyril Wecht forcefully delivered the message that
no one in that room would ever have to confront a Daubert-based hearing. Cyril Wecht, M.D.,
J.D., Comments at the American Academy of Forensic Sciences Annual Meeting (Feb. 15,1995).
59. See. generally KUHN, supra note 35.
60. See Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that a forensic automobile mechanic's testimony was not scientific and that Daubert did not
apply).
61. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
62. Id. at 141-42.
63. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Forensic Engineers, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709).
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by the reliability demands of Daubert.64 As a result, Daubert applies to all expert
opinion testimony, regardless of its particular specialized nature.6 5 While sug-
gesting that the specific factors provided in Daubert would not be as applicable to
the reliability evaluations of many non-scientific types of expert testimony, the
Kumho Tire Court nevertheless made it clear that some form of reliability evalua-
tion of all proffered expert testimony had to be conducted by the trial judge.66
Rounding out the Daubert trilogy is General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,67 in which
the United States Supreme Court established that in federal jurisdictions, the stan-
dard of appellate review of a trial court decision regarding the admission or exclu-
sion of expert testimony (under Daubert) would be abuse of discretion. 68 For
appellants seeking to reverse a decision made by the trial court, abuse of discretion
is the most difficult appellate standard of review to confront.
C. The Standard in Maine and the Other States
At the time that Daubert was granted certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court, most states and federal circuits that articulated a scientific evidence stan-
dard used some form of Frye, but Maine did not. The governing case in Maine,
State v. Williams,69 is similar in important ways to Daubert, which it preceded by
fifteen years, but with one crucial difference. In explicitly disavowing the "gen-
eral acceptance" rule and directing trial judges to look exclusively to Maine Rule
of Evidence 702 (Maine Rule 702),70 neither Williams nor any subsequent Maine
Supreme Judicial Court decision has provided practical guidance for the applica-
tion of that rule to proffered scientific evidence. This seems not to be an oversight,
but rather to reflect a leaning in Maine toward admitting evidence rather than ex-
cluding it.
A recent survey 71 asserts that as of July 2001 twenty-five states adhered to
64. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 141.
65. Id.
66. Many, if not most, states have rules of evidence similar or identical to Rule 702. For
example, Maine Rule 702 is verbatim to the federal version of 702 in its pre-Daubert form.
M.R. EvID. 702.
67. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
68. Id. at 142-43.
69. 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978). Maine cases that follow Williams include: State v. Irving, 2003
ME 31, 818 A.2d 204; In re Jon N, 2000 ME 123, 754 A.2d 346; State v. Kelly, 2000 ME 107,
752, A.2d 188; State v. Tomah, 1999 ME 109, 736 A.2d 1047; State v. Poulliot, 1999 ME 39,
726, A.2d 210; State v. MacDonald, 1998 ME 212, 718 A.2d 195; State v. Fleming, 1997 ME
158, 698 A.2d 503; State v. Taylor, 694 A.2d 907 (Me. 1996); State v. Stade, 683 A.2d 164 (Me.
1996); Kay v. Hanover Ins. Co., 677 A.2d 556 (Me. 1996); State v. Harper, 675 A.2d 495 (Me.
1996); State v. Ellis, 669 A.2d 752 (Me. 1996); State v. Grigsby, 666 A.2d 503 (Me. 1995); State
v. Kennedy, 657 A.2d 773 (Me. 1995); State v. Chapman, 645 A.2d I (Me. 1994); State v. Boobar,
637 A.2d 1162 (Me. 1994); State v. Roman, 622 A.2d 96 (Me. 1993); State v. Boutilier, 426 A.2d
876 (Me. 1981).
70. M.R. EVID. 702. As indicated above, Maine Rule 702, exactly the same as the corre-
sponding federal rule at that time, has not been amended to bring it into compliance with the
federal Rule 702 as amended to reflect Daubert.
71. Alice B. Lustre, Post.Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific And Other Expert
Evidence In State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, 454 (2001).
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Daubert, sixteen were still in the Frye camp,72 six used a combination of, or alter-
nated between the two depending on the nature of the evidence, and four followed
rules of their own devising, and do not fit into any of the previous three catego-
ries.73
The four states that the survey identifies as having devised non-Frye non-
Daubert rules are Wisconsin, Virginia, Georgia, and Utah. 74 The first three ex-
plicitly exclude the Daubert emphasis on reliability; Utah is similar to Daubert in
requiring a reliability check, but seems to apply it more stringently, with the effect
that it tends to exclude evidence that would probably come in under Daubert.75 I
would also place Maine in the non-Frye, non-Daubert category.
The governing Wisconsin case, State v. Walstad,76 is pre-Daubert and ex-
pressly rejects Frye, stating, "[n]owhere in the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence 77 or
in the extensive commentaries to it is the Frye rule mentioned. Under our rules, if
the evidence is relevant, it is admissible, unless it is excluded for some special
reason, such as prejudicial effect or jury confusion." 78 Unlike Daubert and its
progeny, Walstad does not find a "reliability" condition lurking within Rule 702.
Without that, Rule 702 is seen to be a permissive rule, rather than a restrictive one.
It permits expert opinions to be admitted as evidence; apart from the minimal con-
dition of relevance, it places no restrictions on such admission. Consistent with
the Walstad rejection of Frye because of its precondition of reliability, an interme-
diate Wisconsin appellate court subsequently rejected Daubert explicitly.79 Indi-
cating that the gate is wide open, a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case observed
in a footnote that:
72. With respect to trends, a paper this Author co-authored early in the post-Daubert era
listed the late- 1994 breakdown to be twenty-seven states following Frye, nine following Daubert,
and the rest not well defined. Thomas Bohan & Erik Heels, The Case Against Daubert: The
New Scientific Evidence "Standard" and the Standards of the Several States, 40 J. FORENSIC SCL
1030, 1035-36 (1995). Five states, including Maine, were identified at that time as either having
failed to set out a clear standard or as nominally following one and actually following the other.
Id. at 1036. Thirty-eight states had by that time adopted a formal rule of evidence that tracked
federal Rule 702 in the form it had before the Daubert-inspired amendment. Id.
73. It is interesting that Lustre places Maine in the Daubert column in spite of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court having indicated repeatedly that it is not. Lustre, supra note 71, at 502.
See also RICHARD H. FIELD & PETER L. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE § 702.3 (3d ed. 1994), which
insists that State v. Williams governs Maine and that State v. Williams is not Daubert.
74. Lustre, supra note 71, at 543-45.
75. Id. These conclusions are based on State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), wherein
the Utah Supreme Court, citing with approval its earlier commentary in Phillips v. Jackson, 615
P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah 1980), ruled that Utah's adoption of Rule 702 did not do away with
"threshold reliability requirements," and stated "'[an analysis of the admissibility of scientific
evidence, while taking into account general scientific acceptance and widespread practical ap-
plication, must focus in all events on proof of inherent reliability."' State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
at 397 (quoting Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d at 1234).
However, in 2002, the Utah court clarified its Rimmasch decision, stating,"we reaffirm our pre-
vious holdings that the Rimmasch test applies only to novel scientific methods and techniques.
Other scientific testimony is to be evaluated under rule 702 without heightened tests of 'inherent
reliability."' Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068, 1084 (Utah 2003).
76. 351 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. 1984).
77. The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence track the Federal Rules of Evidence.
78. State v. Walstad, 351 N.W.2d at 485-86.
79. State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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In the federal system, trial courts have a significant "gatekeeper" function in
keeping from the jury expert testimony that is deemed unreliable. By contrast,
the trial court's gatekeeper role in Wisconsin is limited. In Wisconsin, "[o]nce
the relevancy of the evidence is established and the witness is qualified as an
expert, the reliability of the evidence is a weight and credibility issue for the fact
finder and any reliability challenges must be made through cross-examination or
by other means of impeachment." 80
Virginia is another laissez faire state regarding any reliability test of scientific
evidence, and apparently has never reversed a judgment based on the improper
admission of scientific evidence. It expressly rejected Frye in 1988, in O'Dell v.
Commonwealth.81 Although in 1990, the Virginia court, while reaffirming its
rejection of Frye, acknowledged that a threshold evaluation of reliability was de-
sirable, it did nothing to implement such evaluations, and simply directed trial
judges to determine reliability through expert testimony, with no guidelines as to
what to look for from that testimony.82 Nevertheless, the Virginia high court has
not ruled out the possibility of its adopting Daubert at some point. In John v. Im,
83
the Virginia court stated:
[W]e do not reach the merits of the issue whether that evidence also failed to
meet the criteria for scientific reliability articulated in Daubert. We note, how-
ever, that we have not previously considered the question whether the Daubert
analysis employed by the federal courts should be applied in our trial courts to
determine the scientific reliability of expert testimony. Therefore, we leave this
question open for future consideration. 84
Finally, Georgia has a standard that is effectively similar to Maine's defacto
standard. In Harper v. State,85 it rejected Frye as tantamount to "counting heads,"
and concluded:
The Frye rule of "counting heads" in the scientific community is not an appropri-
ate way to determine the admissibility of a scientific procedure in evidence....
[W]e hold that it is proper for the trial judge to decide whether the procedure or
technique in question has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty, or in
the words of Professor Irving Younger, whether the procedure "rests upon the
laws of nature. ' 8 6
This so far remains good law.87 However, the Supreme Court of Georgia recently
granted certiorari to hear Orkin Exterminating Corp. v. Carder,88 to consider "What
80. Conley Publ'g Group Ltd. v. Journal Communications, 665 N.W.2d 879, 892-93 n.21
(2003) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); citing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 562
U.S. 137 (1999)).
81. 364 S.E.2d 491 (Va. 1988).
82. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609 (Va. 1990).
83. 559 S.E.2d 694 (Va. 2002).
84. Id. at 697-98. The court also noted that "[p]rior to Daubert, however, we discussed the
trial court's role in making a threshold finding of scientific reliability when unfamiliar scientific
evidence is offered." Id. at 698 n.3 (citations omitted).
85. 292 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 1982).
86. Id. at 395 (footnotes omitted).
87. See Pullin v. State, 534 S.E.2d 69, 70 (2000) ("In determining whether a scientific prin-
ciple or technique has reached a stage of verifiable certainty that it is competent evidence in a
court of law, Harper v. State... controls.").
88. 575 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. 2002), cert. granted No. 503G0650, 2003 Ga. Lexis 379, at *1 (Ga.
Apr. 29, 2003).
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standards or factors should govern the admissibility of expert scientific evidence
in Georgia? Compare Harper v. State with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael."89 The governing statement regarding
the Georgia standard is remarkable. It reflects an all too common misunderstand-
ing about science and its practitioners, and overestimates the ability of persons not
trained in technical fields to determine, with no input from scientists, whether a
particular technique "rests upon the laws of nature." Although some of the lan-
guage of Daubert reflects this attitude, it nevertheless provides guidance for evalu-
ating most kinds of scientific evidence. Without that guidance, most questions of
scientific reliability get left to the jury to decide, a jury that after viewing a "battle
of the experts" is most likely to conclude that scientific opinion on the issue is
evenly divided.90 That is the situation, both in those states-such as Wisconsin
and Georgia-that eschew a reliability requirement, and in those-such as Maine
and Virginia- where no guidance is given in applying the requirement.
II. SPECIFIC TYPES OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE
In this Section, five different examples of forensic evidence will be discussed.
The underlying science will be discussed for each type; as will be seen, each has a
different status and degree of acceptance within the scientific community and with
the courts.
A. Polygraph
1. The Science91
The frustration felt by the authors of the recent National Research Council
polygraph report92 sounds in their characterization of the device and its context:
[S]everal themes in the polygraph debate have long histories: criticism by scien-
tists of the scientific basis of polygraph testing, the development in the popular
culture of a mystique of infallibility for polygraph lie detection, the use of the
polygraph for security screening despite scientific criticism, policy debates lead-
89. Id.
90. One of the embarrassments of our judicial system is the provision it makes for lay juries
to evaluate scientific claims out of context and to thereby arrive at conclusions that are diametri-
cally opposed to those of the scientific community. This can easily happen when the jury is
presented with two expert witnesses who disagree about the validity of a particular scientific
point, not knowing that the entire scientific community is arrayed against one of the witnesses
and on the side of the other. The whole point of judges acting as gatekeepers is to avoid putting
juries in that position. To the extent that judges are unable to exercise this role when it comes to
scientific evidence, justice is compromised.
91. Misleading as the lie detector label is, it provides more specificity than "polygraph," a
completely general name referring to the instrument that measures several parameters at once
and plots them with multiple pens on recorder paper. In contrast, the instrument at issue in Frye
measured just one variable-systolic blood pressure-as a truthfulness gauge.
92. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMIES, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003),
available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) [hereinafter
POLYORAPH AND LIE DETECTION].
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ing to decisions to end polygraph security screening programs, and debates over
openness in polygraph research. 93
Of all techniques that may be classified as scientific evidence, the lie detector
appears to hold the record for the number of years over which it has been exam-
ined, as suggested by the above passage.94 It would appear from case law that
these studies have not been needed to educate the judicial system, but rather are
requested because of the misplaced confidence that the public and governmental
agencies place in them. It is as if each generation of public officials discover for
the first time that lie detectors are not reliable, and in fact that there is no scientific
evidence that they are able to detect lies about specific events or to serve as screeners
of security risks or dishonest employees. And so, a new study is requested. The
latest one was requested by the Department of Energy (DOE) in connection with
pressure to carry out widescale security screenings of its employees. 95
Unlike the public, the courts, beginning with Frye, have viewed lie detector
tests with appropriate skepticism. As noted elsewhere, the Frye standard itself
stems from a rejection of lie detector evidence in 1923.96 Here it is noted that the
enduring presence of polygraphs in the face of scientific and judicial rejection has
two bases. One is the use that investigating agencies make of the polygraph to
induce a suspect to confess, a use that is independent of whether the polygraph can
actually detect lies. One aspect of its use in interrogation is, ironically, to lie about
its results, playing on the suspect's faith in the instrument. This technique was
used by the FBI in an interview with the Los Alamos physicist Wen Ho Lee, who
was suspected of spying for China.97 A major focus in the lengthy interrogation
93. Id. at 291. It is not possible to use the word "science" without thinking about the disputes
in recent years regarding what is science and what is not. In spite of some commentators' belief
that Daubert reduced the word to phenomena and techniques based on Newton's Laws of Mo-
tion, this discussion will follow the longer judicial tradition of referring to all practices that use
specialized technical methods as being based on a science.
94. Id. at 1-6 (discussing "The Lie Detector Mystique").
95. POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 92.
96. See supra Part fl.A.
97. Interview by FBI with Wen Ho Lee, suspected spy (Mar. 7, 1999), at www.wenholee.org
(last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (accessed by clicking on the Documents item in the column on the
left, and then clicking on "Declassified Transcript of FBI interrogation" under "FBI Documents").
The "identifier" (xxx) was used in the released transcript to indicate that one of the two FBI
agents was talking. A typical portion of the transcript follows:
(xxx): ... do you know what's in this package? Do you know what's in the package
that I got today and the phone call that I got from Washington? You failed your
polygraphs.
Lee: Okay.
(xxx): You failed the one that you, you had in December. Okay? You failed that. The
polygraph that (xxx) gave you?
Lee: Uh-mm.
(xxx): You couldn't pass it. When they asked you questions and they got down to
issues about code issues, and they got down to weapons questions. You couldn't pass
your polygraph.
Lee: That, that, Washington, D.C., polygraph. They did not ask me anything about
codes.
(xxx): The Department of Energy polygraph?
Lee: They did.
(xxx): Whatever they asked you, you failed.
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was the repeated lie that Dr. Lee had "failed" both polygraph tests administered to
him earlier. Although this approach did not seem to work with Dr. Lee, it is indis-
putable that police lies during interrogation can induce innocent suspects to con-
fess to crimes, as a recent example in Maine illustrates. 98 The polygraph then just
becomes one more, albeit important, psychological weapon to be applied during
police interrogations.
Unfortunately, the enduring use of the polygraph is also due to the fact that
scientific evaluations of it over the years have been carried out primarily by advo-
cates of the polygraph's use, and meant to demonstrate its efficacy. Because of its
limitation, no tests yet performed have demonstrated that the polygraph detects
lies. It would be far better if objective and scientifically acceptable tests of the
instrument were carried out, ones that would determine either that the polygraph
can detect lies (and if so, under what circumstances and with what degree of con-
fidence) or, in the alternative, that it is no better than chance at detecting lies. Such
tests are difficult to carry out, but not impossible, as is discussed in the recent
National Research Council report. They would be very expensive, however, be-
cause of the noted difficulty, and is the type of undertaking that would only be
supported by government funding. It would seem an appropriate use of funds by
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and in particular by the DOJ National Insti-
tute of Justice (NIJ). A cynical explanation for why this has not been done is that
powerful lobbies do not want to risk the likely outcome, which would remove the
polygraph from the armaments of the police and security agencies. As will be
discussed, the National Research Council found that, although there is no evidence
that the polygraph can detect lies, there is evidence that when used in connection
with interrogation concerning specific events, it is possible that the interrogation
Lee: ... they only asked one question. Do you know what question is that?
(xxx): What was the question, WEN HO?
Lee: They only asked me. It's hard for me to say it, but it's something like uh,
(pause). Did I pass information to somebody who can use that information to over-
throw the U.S. Government (chuckles). Something like that. Do you understand?
(xxx): Well you failed! You failed that question!
Lee: How do you know I fail?
(xxx): I got it right here! The reports that they sent me! The video tapes when you
were video taped in your polygraph?...
Lee: Yeah.
(xxx): ... all the analysis that's been done in Washington! You failed WEN HO!
Lee: Why, why they told me...
(xxx): There's there's a black line and there's a white line. You either passed or you
failed. You failed. When (xxx) talked to you in February? He asked you questions.
Lee: (Sighs).
(xxx): ... And then (xxx) gave you a polygraph, you know what the results say in the
second package? You failed that too. You failed everything!
Interview by FBI with Wen Ho Lee, suspected spy (Mar. 7, 1999), at http://www.wenholee.org.
98. A False Confession to Murder, at http://www.mtcforensics.com/confession.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2003). Raymond Wood was held in a York County jail for a year, awaiting trial,
based on his "confession" during a lengthy interrogation in which he was told that the victim's
hair had been found adhering to the underside of his van. These statements were not justified by
the evidence at hand and in fact turned out to be false. When the judge viewed the interrogation
tape, he threw out the confession and the State dropped the case.
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has a rate of success in detecting untruths that is greater than what would be ex-
pected by chance.
In light of the statement that there has not been a scientific testing of the poly-
graph, one may ask how its effectiveness can be dismissed. In fact, all that can be
said is that the polygraph has not been proven to detect lies or to confirm that the
examinee is telling the truth. The scientific method, which courts have repeatedly
held to be a necessary substrate for all scientific evidence, presumes that until
something has been shown to be true, it is not accepted as true. In spite of the
obvious value of this approach to all fields of knowledge, it appears that in many
non-scientific fields and quasi-scientific fields, the opposite approach is adopted,
where a statement is accepted as true as long as it has not been proven false. 99
Indeed, those who claimed that the Frye standard of general scientific acceptance
placed too tight a requirement on the admissibility of scientific evidence should be
comfortable with this philosophy. Such people fretted that the Frye test would
prevent a modem-day Galileo from testifying based on his theories, because they
would not have "general acceptance" within the scientific community. Even to the
extent that the premise underlying the Galileo analogy is correct (and it probably is
not), 100 a rule that permits any opinion witness to testify to his or her own idiosyn-
cratic theory, its merit to be decided by lay jurors before it had been tested by the
scientific community is what would make our system of justice fall into disrepute
if not make it a laughing stock.10 1
The just-published report of the National Research Council regarding its evalu-
ation of the polygraph is an excellent example of what a technique or theory must
be to have the general acceptance of the scientific community. This work by the
National Research Council is an indication of how the judicial system may con-
nect with the scientific community in evaluating a wide range of scientific tech-
niques and thus determine whether the respective techniques have general accep-
tance. Because of this, I digress in order to describe the National Research Council
in some detail and in particular to set out how it comes to address scientific ques-
tions of national interest.
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was established in 1863, to serve
as an entity that would "investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any
99. For example the field of medicine is rife with plausible-sounding advice that has ulti-
mately been withdrawn when the theory underlying the advice, after it is subjected to a scientific
test, is found to be wrong. See, e g., Editorial, Rethinking Hormone Therapies, N.Y. TIMES,
April 28, 2002, § 4, at 14 (questioning the effectiveness of hormone treatment for post-meno-
pausal women).
100. The scientists of Galileo's time widely accepted the theory-published in detail by
Copernicus and others long before Galileo--that the earth revolved around the sun. For a recent
discussion of the acceptance of the earth-centered solar system during Galileo's lifetime, see
DAvA SOBEL, GALILEO'S DAUGHTER: A HISTORICAL MEMOIR OF SCIENCE, FAITH, AND LOVE (2000).
101. Several high-profile cases exist where even worse violence to logic has been done. In
these cases, juries have been allowed to decide whether certain medical treatments were patho-
genic, and have decided that they were in spite of scientific testing showing that they were not.
One example is that of breast implants as a cause of lupus. Even as a federal judge was working
out a four billion dollar settlement in a class action, scientific results involving large numbers of
women were being published showing that there was no link. James T. Rosenbaum, Lessons
from Litigation over Silicone Breast Implants: A Call for Activism by Scientists, 276 SCl. 1524
(1997). For a sequel involving one of the few instances where a federal judge availed himself of
expertise pursuant to Rule 706, see Jocelyn Kaiser, Scientific Panel Clears Breast Implants, 282
Sci. 1963 (1998).
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subject of science or art" whenever called upon to do so by any department of the
government. 102 In general, the NAS members were not government employees
and the NAS itself was not a governmental agency per se. 103 The National Re-
search Council was added in 1916, the National Academy of Engineering in 1964,
and the Institute of Medicine in 1970, all ultimately under the umbrella label of
National Academies. The National Research Council is the active arm of the Na-
tional Academies; 104 for example, when a branch of the federal government re-
quests the NAS to undertake a study, it is the National Research Council that es-
tablishes the group that will actually conduct the study and prepare the report. It
also oversees the study and provides resources from throughout the National Acad-
emies to assist the assigned committee. Because of the immense prestige of the
National Academies, these studies can draw upon any personnel resources that it
feels are needed.
Participating in the just-completed National Research Council polygraph study
were the Committee on National Statistics and Board on Behavioral, Cognitive,
and Sensory Sciences, Units of the National Research Council's Division of Be-
havioral and Social Sciences and Education. 105 The working committee consisted
of fourteen individuals, primarily from academia, and drawn from a diversity of
technical fields, including, but not limited to, psychology, statistics, neurology,
and epidemiology. 10 6 This attests to the universality of the scientific community.
The crucial skill that an individual brings to the evaluation of an instrument, theory,
or technique, is the ability to assess data directly and recognize a scientifically
sound procedure, as well as to evaluate the limitations (the "error bars") of all such
procedures. This is true whether the tests relate to DNA, polygraphs, parapsychol-
ogy, or any other theory or procedure that adherents claim has been tested and
confirmed. 107 Bolstering these skills is an ingrained distrust of all claims that
certain phenomena can be observed and theories confirmed only if the right person
is doing the test or if the test is conducted with only very special research equip-
ment, or using components only available for a specific manufacturer. Of course,
someone has to be the first to observe a new discovery, which means that the ear-
liest reports of a discovery will always be based on specific people doing tests with
specific laboratory equipment. It is precisely because of this that the modem sci-
102. An Act to Incorporate the National Academy of Sciences, Ch. 111, 12 Stat. 806 (1863).
103. The NationalAcademies, at http://www.nationalacademies.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
104. See Organization of the National Research Council, at http://www.nationalacademics.org
archives/nrcorganization.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
105. POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 92.
106. Id. at 375-80.
107. The opinion in Daubert takes something of a detour to discuss philosopher-of-science
Karl Popper and his thesis that a theory must be testable if it is scientific. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). The word "falsifiable" is always linked with
Popper's thesis because of his formulation in which this word is repeatedly used in preference to
"testable." It is probably the opinion of most scientists-at least those who think at all about the
Popper doctrine of falsifiability-that his revelation is completely obvious and that the only
people edified by it are other philosophers and students of philosophy. Nevertheless, much ink
has been devoted to this falsifiability doctrine, both in Daubert and in other post-Daubert writ-
ings on scientific evidence. As a result of Justice Blackmun's Popper references, "testability" is
listed as one of the Daubert factors. A moment's reflection regarding the types of theories that
are not testable shows how worthless testability is as a measure of whether particular scientific
evidence is reliable. And the same follows, of course, for falsifiable.
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entific method demands that in order for a discovery to be accepted at large, the
first discoverers must publish their results in a peer-reviewed journal, 108 along
with a methods description that is clear enough so that others who are not ac-
quainted with the discoverers or their laboratory can understand them. The next
step is for others who are following those methods to see whether they can repro-
duce the results. It is a sad fact that most exciting new discoveries turn out not to
be sustainable (that is, believable) once this second stage of the scientific process
is reached. The more exciting the discovery, the quicker the denouement, because
exciting discoveries bring in many evaluators. The history of polywater, "cold
fusion," N-rays, and other such earthshaking "discoveries" should heighten the
wall of the courtroom against theories and techniques not accepted by the scien-
tific community at large. In each case, the first reports were made by reputable
and respected scientists (although, in the case of "cold fusion," the first report was
at a press conference rather than through the accepted method of dissemination of
scientific information). 109 In each case, after attempts to replicate the results by
other scientists failed, these theories were rejected both by scientists working in
the relevant fields and by scientists at large. Also in each case was left a small
residue of true believers, scientists who could not give up an idea that seemed so
exciting, and even some dishonest practices emerged to keep the idea alive. Tell-
ing is the response of one scientist to a science reporter's question at the outset of
the cold fusion flurry, asking whether the whole thing was a fraud: "No, but give
it two months and it will be." 110 It is this winnowing ability that usually leads to
objective science discarding many of the so-called tests of validity that supporters
of a technique initially tout.
In the present context it is the use of the polygraph in relation to specific
instances, such as determining whether the examinee is lying in response to ques-
tions about certain well-defined events, whether he stole the money from a par-
ticular store, sold particular classified documents, or murdered his girlfriend last
Friday night, that is of interest. Because of this, it may seem at first to be unfortu-
nate that the National Research Council was charged not to evaluate polygraphs as
used in such contexts, but rather to evaluate their efficacy in detecting security
risks through widespread screening of applicants for sensitive positions. 11 1 The
results of such a study would also be relevant to general pre-employment and on-
the-job screening for dishonesty.
108. A person who does not understand "peer-reviewed" or what is meant by "peer-reviewed
journal" is a person innocent of knowledge regarding how scientists work. These terms are
embedded in the system by which scientists turn their research results into papers published in
the professional literature, which is comprised of peer-reviewed journals. A paper submitted for
publication to such a journal is farmed out by the receiving editor to two or three reviewers
working in the scientific field from which the paper emanates. Based on the reports of these
reviewers ("referees") the paper is accepted, accepted subject to revision, or rejected. From the
language of Daubert, it is clear that the Court understood "peer-reviewed." Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594. Not so for some subsequent courts, which seemed to believe
that talking to one's "peers" about one's method of measurement constitute "peer review." See,
e.g., State v. Irving, CR-SOM-01-599 (Me. Super. Ct., Som. Cty., _ ) (Marden, J.), affid
2003 ME 31, 818 A.2d 204.
109. GARY TAUBES, BAD SCIENCE: THE SHolr LIFE AND WEIRD TIMES OF COLD FusION 104, 112
(1993).
110. Id. at 314.
111. POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 92, at 2.
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The charge to the National Research Council was not to carry out its own
validation tests of polygraphs (an immense undertaking, as mentioned above), but
rather to evaluate the validation tests that had been done to date. 112 In other words,
the Committee was to evaluate the testers and their results.
It turned out that essentially no validation tests of polygraphs for general screen-
ing purposes had ever been done. 113 Reasoning that if the polygraph was to be
effective in the "soft" area of probing for general dishonesty, the Committee de-
cided that a necessary, though probably not sufficient, condition was that it had to
be effective when used in connection with specific events. 114 Consequently, the
Committee set out to locate and evaluate all existing polygraph validation studies,
nearly all of which related to questioning targeted persons about specific events.
Out of the many thousands of articles published on polygraphs, the Committee
turned up a total of 194 experiments presented as validation studies. 
115
The Committee's staff then reviewed the experiments, just retaining for study
those experiments that reported examiners' conclusions regarding specific ques-
tions, and also reported the truthfulness with which the examinees had answered
those questions. 116 There were further criteria applied as well, as set out in the
report's Appendix G, which explains how the original 194 studies were reduced to
fifty-seven for evaluation by the Committee. 117 In assessing the significance of
the tests reported in the fifty-seven prior studies, the studies were not combined
into a meta-analysis, in part because of the heterogeneity of conditions and tech-
niques among the various tests. 118 Although meta-studies are not objectionable
per se, it is very important to establish the similarity of the experiments from which
data is combined. Further, some meta-studies are meaningless by their very na-
ture. Failure to recognize the significance of the way a test or collection of tests is
structured can lead to nonsensical results. Consider, for example, a reexamination
of a tennis match using a meta-analysis, wherein it is argued that the loser of a set
of matches was really the winner of the match because he won more individual
games.
Many of the fifty-seven studies in the Committee report had more than one set
of data. The Committee decided to avoid an improper weighting by selecting a
single data set from each of the studies, and to lump together those data sets from
112. Id.
113. The Committee found only four studies aimed at measuring polygraph efficacy for the
purpose of screening job applicants or current employees, and only one that was directed at
screening for national security purposes. Id. at 3-4.
114. Id. at 106.
115. Id. at 107.
116. Id.
117. ld. at 323-39. The Committee did not require that in order to be considered, a study had
to have been published in a refereed journal. Id. at 324. Although publication in a refereed
journal is a key indicator of legitimacy for a technical paper, the Committee was not looking for
indicia of reliability, but was evaluating the reported tests for reliability. Id. Indeed, the work of
the Committee with each study was tantamount to a very high degree of refereeing.
118. Id. That the Committee addressed the possibility of a meta-analysis is particularly
relevant to the Daubert discussion. In Daubert the proffered evidence at issue on appeal before
the Ninth Circuit was a meta-study excluded at the trial court. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991). The proffered testimony was based on combining data
from several independent studies of teratogenicity of the drug Benedictin in humans. Id. None
of the individual studies showed teratogenicity, though it was asserted that when all of their
individual data were combined, there was some slight suggestion that the drug was teratogenic.
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different studies that were: (1) similar in nature and (2) involved the same demo-
graphic group. This led to a total of fifty data sets for analysis.
Of the fifty data sets, thirty-four were from studies that placed examiners'
assessments of individual polygraph responses into three categories: (1) indicat-
ing deception; (2) indicating no deception; and (3) inconclusive. 119 This tripartite
division was important, since a great deal of the supposed "success rate" in a study
depended upon how the "inconclusive" responses were interpreted. Those studies
that addressed the three categories permitted the Committee to determine for itself
the rates of true positives and false positives. 120 (A true positive is a correct con-
clusion that the examinee lied; a false positive is a conclusion of lying when none
occurred. Although rates of true and false negatives could also in theory be deter-
mined under laboratory conditions, these rates have little meaning in connection
with actual interrogations.) The seventeen data sets from validation tests that sim-
ply categorized examiners' assessments of polygraph responses as either indicat-
ing deception or no deception, with no "inconclusive" category, did not permit any
such determination by the Committee. 121
The Committee concluded that, based on the fifty data sets reviewed, the poly-
graph examiner had a somewhat greater likelihood of detecting a falsehood relat-
ing to a specific event than chance alone would indicate. 122 However, from a legal
standpoint, even if that conclusion could be applied to the real universe of interro-
gations using polygraphs, it would be insufficient to justify the admission of poly-
graph evidence in a court of law, whether the standard is Frye or Daubert. More-
over, the Committee concluded that its assessment of the laboratory tests cannot
be applied to the real universe of polygraph interrogations concerning specific
events, because the validation studies were not representative of the field use of
polygraphs. 123
Addressing the actual question the Committee had been assigned to study, it
concluded further that, given the softness of the questioning involved in general-
ized screening for dishonesty, there was little basis for concluding that polygraphs
could detect such dishonesty with a greater-than-chance likelihood. 124 This con-
clusion led to the Committee's recommendation that polygraph testing for national
security purposes be terminated. 125
Though the 2003 National Research Council study is more thorough in that it
reports to have examined every polygraph validation study it could locate, it does
not provide conclusions differing from the earlier scientific assessments. 126 In-
deed, as set out in Appendix E of the Committee's report, the National Research
119. POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 92, at 122.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. id. at 123.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
126. See POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 92, at 212 ("Almost a century of research
in scientific psychology and physiology provides little basis for the expectation that a polygraph
test could have extremely high accuracy."). The NRC's conclusion is quite similar to the con-
clusions expressed in 1917 by the chair of the NRC's Committee on Psychology, John F. Shepard.
Id. at 292.
[Vol. 56:1
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE
Council had experience with lie detector evaluation practically from its inception. 127
Its records show that William M. Marston, the man most commonly credited with
inventing the polygraph technique, contacted the Council in 1917, seeking assis-
tance in his further work with the device. 128 Marston, who was a Harvard law
student at the time, and who may also have been a graduate student, since he re-
ceived a Harvard Ph.D. in psychology in 1921, suggested that his device could
have wartime security applications. 129 In partial response, the Council set up a
subcommittee to evaluate "methods of testing for deception" and to evaluate
Marston's approach. 130 Two weeks later, Marston wired the Council, "[r]emarkable
results thirty deception test under iron clad precautions letter follow" and shortly
thereafter sent a letter describing the experiments and reporting his work with the
Boston Municipal Court. 13 1 It seems that the only report from the subcommittee
that is extant is in the form of the letter sent to Marston by the subcommittee's
chair, John Shepard. 132 After expressing his skepticism of the blood pressure tech-
nique for monitoring truthfulness, in light of earlier work that had been reported,
Shepard next suggested alternative physiological parameters to work with, but
cautioned that there would still not be a one-to-one correlation between the physi-
ological changes and the truthfulness of the subject. 133 Finally, and possibly in
reaction to Marston's claims of "remarkable results" and "ironclad precautions,"
Shepard suggested changes that Marston might implement so as to avoid experi-
mental bias.134 The 2003 Committee noted the similarity of those words to what
continues to be said about polygraphs more than eighty years later.135 In the early
1920s Dr. Marston testified as an expert witness in the trial underlying Frye,1 36
and in general had a remarkable career, one that included his creating the Wonder
Woman character. 137 The Committee cites the Wonder Woman Website and her
mythological lie detector described there: "The magic lasso ... was unbreakable,
infinitely stretchable, and could make all who are encircled in it tell the truth." 138
After alluding to the decades of scientific evaluations, all of which led to the
same conclusions and recommendations, the Committee questioned why there had
been no policy changes or, at the very least, full-fledged validation studies launched
in all of the areas of interest. 139 In light of the attitudes reflected by the DOE's
reception of the report that it authorized, one might suggest that the Committee's
question was a rhetorical one. The report was submitted in October 2002. In April
2003, the DOE announced that the polygraph examinations are "a tool that appears
in current circumstances well-suited" 140 to security goals, and further that it "does
127. Id. at 291.
128. Id. at 292.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 292-93.
134. Id. at 293.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 295.
138. Id.
139. See POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETEcION, supra note 92, at 6.
140. Office of Counterintelligence; Polygraph Examination Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,886-
02, 17,887 (April 14, 2003) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 709).
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not believe that the issues that the [National Research Council] has raised about
the polygraph's accuracy are sufficient to warrant a decision by DOE to abandon it
as a screening tool."'14 1
In spite of the DOE's response, and in spite of the benefits that various other
agencies see in the use of the polygraph, the latest NRC report lays to rest the
question of whether polygraphs, as presently designed and evaluated, have general
acceptance within the scientific community. They do not. The NRC report should
be accepted as the final word on all of the attempts to show the polygraph's ability
to detect deception, and statements that there is scientific support for their accu-
racy should be seen for what they are: puffing and distortion. 142
2. The Courts
Given the uniformly hostile reception of the courts to lie detectors as the source
of evidence both before and after Daubert, it may be said that too much space has
been devoted to their discussion in a paper purporting to address changes in scien-
tific evidence and forensic science in the wake of Daubert. It is submitted that this
space was justified as a means of providing a case study so that courts in the future
can effectively address the factor of general acceptance by the scientific commu-
nity, which, for most types of scientific evidence, should be the most important of
the "Daubert factors."
Because of the continuing rejection by scientists of polygraphs, there has been
little concern that polygraph evidence would ever be admitted under the Frye stan-
dard. With Daubert perceived as loosening the "overly strict" conditions of Frye
and, in principle, establishing a standard where anything that the trial judge con-
cluded had been done by the scientific method could be admitted, there was con-
cern that polygraph evidence would finally be admitted. The typical judge, well-
141. Id. at 17,888. Four months after spuming the NRC report it had requested, the DOE
backed down a little. About to face congressional criticism over the broad screening use of the
polygraph, Deputy Energy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow announced a new DOE policy that he
predicted would reduce the number of persons subject to polygraph screening from 20,000 to
about 4,500, "mainly in sensitive arms and intelligence posts." He added the factually incorrect
statement that "[n]o one has suggested that we abandon their use," followed by the disingenuous
clause "or that we hire people and entrust them with national defense information with no prior
checks or reviews whatsoever." William J. Broad, Government to Give Fewer Lie Detector
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at 17A.
142. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Committee of Concerned Social Scientists, United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1997) (No. 96-1133) (definitely not to be confused with the
Union of Concerned Scientists, which consists of scientists). This brief supported the Respon-
dent, citing a 1987 military court holding that polygraphs "had reached a level of scientific
reliability such that they should not be routinely excluded from court--martial proceedings." id.
at 2. (The subsequently promulgated Military Rule of Evidence 707 categorically prohibits
polygraph results from being used in any court-martial proceeding.) Id. Respondent in Scheffer
had been prevented from introducing exculpatory polygraph results at trial. United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed,
and the government appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the reliability
and helpfulness of polygraph tests are widely questioned by the scientific community, and there-
fore lack general scientific acceptance. Id. at 307. Startlingly, the Committee of Concerned
Social Scientists' brief asserts "polygraph tests are generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity as evidenced by the volume of publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals and by
surveys of scientists." Amicus Curiae Brief at 3.
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trained in the law but with no training in science, could very well be convinced by
a trained polygraph technician that the device works and is based on the scientific
method.
There have, in fact, been a few examples where the concern expressed above
was realized. In United States v. Crumby143 polygraph results were accepted into
evidence based on the following justification:
In general, the Court concludes that the maturation of the science of
polygraphy, when properly coupled with a cautious acceptance of this science by
federal courts, will lead to a fairer and more just system of criminal and civil
jurisprudence. Courts must assist the trier of fact in its quest to ascertain the
truth, while ensuring that the trier of fact is not unduly [misled] or prejudiced.
Thus, the Court is compelled to reexamine the current state of the law based on
the particular set of facts in this case, the advances in the science of polygraphy,
the reasoning of Piccinonna, and Daubert and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals... ("Daubert 11"). 144
The Crumby court also stated that the polygraph had been tested via the scien-
tific method, has peer-reviewed publications, has a known error rate, and is "ac-
cepted by polygraphers and its use is endorsed by a number of organizations." 145
B. Fingerprints
1. The Science
Until recently, fingerprint evidence was considered the gold standard of iden-
tification, the forensic identification technique with which all others were com-
pared. Indeed, one way in which later identification techniques were touted (con-
sciously or unconsciously) was by suggestive labels invoking fingerprints: as with
voice spectroscopy ("voiceprints") and forensic DNA analysis ("genetic finger-
printing"). Thus, the forensic science community reacted with varying degrees of
shock and disbelief to claims that fingerprint identification had never undergone
the type of testing called for in Daubert, and that there is nowhere in the open
literature where one can learn about the rates of false matches ("false positives"). 146
To those not familiar with the controversy, it seemed at first that the primary,
if not sole, objection of the critics was the lack of proof of the oft-repeated state-
ment that no two fingerprints are alike. The initial responses of those rejecting the
claim that fingerprint matching did not comply with the Daubert standard were
largely centered on this issue, which, compared to the others, is essentially a straw
man. This allowed defenders of fingerprint evidence to sound reasonable in ridi-
culing the critics, one of the most prominent of whom was Simon Cole. 147 Indeed,
some of the critics of the critics continue to lash this straw man. However, they
also misconstrue the significance of the critics' claim that the error rate in finger-
143. 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995).
144. Id. at 1358.
145. Id. at 1358, 1360.
146. See, e.g., Edward Imwinkelried, Fingerprint Science, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23, 2003 at B 14.
147. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HIsToRY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFI-
CATION (2001).
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print matching is not zero. 148 Even Henry Lee, perhaps the best known forensic
scientist in the country, characterizes in a recent book the fingerprint dispute as
involving no more than an argument over the standard that should be used in de-
claring a match. 149 Whereas there has been criticism of the varying standards or
lack of standards of this type, this also is not the primary issue of the critics.
The major criticism of those claiming that at present, the technique of latent
fingerprint identification does not satisfy Daubert is that there has never been a
validation study of the technique. More specifically, they claim there has never
been a scientific validation test of the rate of false positives (erroneous matches) or
false negatives (failure to see a match that does exist) when partial fingerprints are
compared with full rolled fingerprints of known persons. 150 Prints lifted from
crime scenes normally contain only a fraction of the fingerprint of the individual
who left it there. They are partial prints. 15 1 It does not require someone experi-
enced in fingerprint identification to realize that, as the print fraction gets smaller,
there will come a point where it does not contain enough information to support a
match between the latent print and a specific known print. Stated differently, there
will come a point at which the information contained in a crime-scene print is
consistent with the fingerprints of more than one person. 152 Furthermore, even
with fairly large partial prints, the poor quality usually inherent in latent prints
recovered from a crime scene compromises the comparison. The typical response
of fingerprint examiners is that they know what they are doing and know when
there is not enough information in the latent print to support a match. 153 The
148. See, for example, the website of Ed German, a fingerprint examiner for the U.S. Army
criminal investigation laboratory, who suggests that the critics are saying that because some
examiners make errors some of the time, the whole enterprise should be discarded. Introducing
an argument by analogy that has come up more than once in this very form, Mr. German states,
"(m]ath is not bad science despite practitioner error." Ed German, Regarding Recent News
Articles on Fingerprint Evidence Credibility in Court, at http://onin.comfp/stmtrefarticles.htm
(June 11, 2001).
149. HENRY C. LEE & THOMAS W. O'NEIL, CRACKING CASES: THE SCIENCE OF SOLVING CRIMES
(2002).
150. The FBI reports having used its AFIS to compare every one of 50,000 rolled prints with
every one of a second set of 50,000 rolled prints, where it had been documented that no overlap
should exist between the sets. It reported that not a single match was found in this automated
search which, by its nature does not have a match-distinguishing ability as great as that of trained
human examiners. Goverment's Combined Report to the Court and Motions in Limine Con-
cerning Fingerprint Evidence, United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(No. CR.A. 96-407-1). It is important to note the distinction between rolled prints--complete
fingerprints secured under controlled conditions, usually by a fingerprint technician-and latent
prints, essentially always partial prints of mediocre quality inadvertently left at a crime scene.
151. There is swam testimony by an FBI official that the average latent print contains only
about 21% of the full fingerprint. Hearing Day Two Transcript of Stephen Meager, United
States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 96-407-1), available at http://
www.clpex.com/Information/USvMitchell/2DaubertHearingTranscripts/
US_v_MitchellDaubertHearingDay_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
152. The second basis for the criticism is the lack of uniform standards guiding fingerprint
examiners in determining whether a match exists. Although fingerprint-matching has a large
subjective component, there are still some objective components where quantitative standards
could be imposed, such as the minimum number of matching points ("Galton points") necessary
to declare a match. In contrast to most police agencies in the world, most U.S. agencies, includ-
ing the FBI, do not require a minimum number.
153. See generally CRAIG A. COPPOCK, CONTRAST AN INVESTIGATOR'S BASIC REFERENCE GUIDE
To FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION AND CONCEPTS (2001).
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critics say that though that may very well be true, it is not enough, from a scientific
method point of view, to simply make this claim in the absence of validation tests
that are open to review by everyone. 154
In spite of various jeremiads that the technique has been tested for over 100
years, 155 it seems undisputed to one understanding the nature of scientific testing
and statistical analysis that the type of validation studies referred to above have not
been done. It also seems, given the computerized Automatic Fingerprint Identifi-
cation Systems (AFIS) that now exist, such tests could be commenced immedi-
ately, especially in the FBI with its huge database of prints. 156 The rate of false
positives can be studied as a function of many different variables, including the
examiner training, size of latent print (both in terms of area and in terms of infor-
mation points it contains), quality of latent print, and the nature of the surface from
which it was obtained. The beauty of having the data already available, and largely
in electronic form, is that even starting with a narrowly directed study, valuable
information can be obtained.
Rather than undertake such studies, many of the large police agencies and
individual fingerprint examiners are taking a defensive stance, attacking the cre-
dentials of their critics and making arguments that do not address the significance
of the validation tests. 157 An example of this was observed by this author at the
2002 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences in Atlanta.
At a well-attended breakfast seminar, Simon Cole presented a talk on the subject
of the fingerprint dispute. Seated together at a large round table close to the lectern
was a group of fingerprint examiners and administrators, including a number from
the FBI. After making sotto voce comments throughout the talk, at the conclusion
of the talk, one of the people in this group asked rhetorically, "[S]uppose that in a
roomful of mathematicians one of them made an error in adding up a column of
numbers. Does that mean that the entire science of mathematics is wrong and should
be discarded?" He concluded by lifting up two cups of coffee and challenging
Cole to say how many cups were in his hands. Cole responded that the analogy
was not apt. Someone from the audience then pointed out that scientists and math-
ematicians do not consider mathematics to be a science in the first place, and that
line of discussion ended. 158
Some responses from persons presuming to speak for fingerprint examiners
do attempt to address the critics' call for validation studies. These responses in-
154. See COLE, supra note 147.
155. United States v. Llera Plaza, No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at * 11-12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,
2002).
156. See supra note 150.
157. It is possible that police agencies and examiners, many of whom lack formal scientific
training, simply do not understand what a scientific validation test is, and the fact that one does
not have to be an expert in a technique in order to evaluate the tests that purport to validate that
technique. This is suggested by the government's argument in Lera Plaza, an argument based
on the conclusory assertion that fingerprinting had already been "tested" for over one hundred
years by juries that had convicted defendants based on fingerprint evidence. United States v.
Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305, at *9.
158. Although the retort that mathematics is not a science was itself a cheap shot, the fact is
that even if the analogy had been made to a science, it would still have been inapt and mislead-
ing. No one is saying that fingerprint matching should be abandoned because it is not perfect.
The demand is simply that the level of "perfection" be tested for.
159. See Andre A. Moenssens, Is Fingerprint Identification a "Science"?, at http://
www.forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/lD00004 2.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). Moenssens
is the author of several books on the subject of fingerprint evidence.
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clude the observation that declaring a match between a latent print and a rolled
print is not amenable to statistical analysis, or to the setting of any absolute stan-
dards. This line of response suggests further that, as far as identification goes,
fingerprints are better than DNA. Unlike a DNA match, which must be accompa-
nied by a probabilistic statement regarding the likelihood that a match exists with
a second person, a fingerprint match is a definitive identification of the person
identified, with 100% likelihood. 159 Apart from glossing over the minuscule prob-
ability that a forensic DNA match does not indicate that the unknown sample must
have come from the known individual, this is yet another masking of the contro-
versy, shoving it back into the false dispute about fingerprint uniqueness. The
critics are not denying that a correct fingerprint match definitively establishes that
the defendant left the print at the crime scene, but rather, argue that the probability
relates to the likelihood that the match is correct, something that cannot be done at
present because the necessary validation studies have never been done.
There are also some responsive answers to the critics' complaint that there are
no standards for establishing that a match exists. In part, this relates to differences
among various police agencies in the U.S. and other countries as to whether there
should be a minimum quantitative standard for declaring a match. Many agencies,
especially outside the U.S., do have such a standard, based on the number of Galton
points (referring to ridges, bifurcations, etc.) that must be the same on the two
prints being compared. Some agencies require a minimum of fourteen, others six-
teen. The FBI does not have a minimum requirement, something that it dropped
from its matching protocol more than fifty years ago. 160 This means that the FBI
follows no minimum standard, and certainly not a quantitative one. Its primary
response to this criticism is that there is a lot more to fingerprints than Galton
points, and that in the end the decision as to whether a match exists is a subjective
one. 161 That is, the full picture of a fingerprint includes the second order aspects
of the ridges, grooves, etc., aspects such as the variation in their height and depth
along their length that are impossible to quantify or to describe with precision. In
this regard, fingerprint matching is like general pattern recognition, which involves
elements that cannot be articulated. Consider, for example, the typical human's
ability to recognize thousands of different human faces at a glance, coupled with
an inability to state the reasons for the recognition apart from listing a few salient
facial features common to millions of people. 162
160. Hearing Day Two Transcript of Stephen Meager at 105, United States v. Mitchell, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 96-407-1), available at http://www.clpex.comfInformation/
USvMitchell/2DaubertHearingTranscripts/US-vMitchellDaubertHearingDay_2.pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2003).
161. Hearing Day One Transcript of David Ashbaugh at 115, United States v. Mitchell, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 96-407-1), available at http://www.cipex.com/Information/
USvMitchell/2DaubertHearingTranscriptsUS-vMitchellDaubertHearingDay-l .pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2003).
162. The computer programs now being developed to provide automated facial recognition
have to date not come close to the human ability in this regard. They are analogous to AFIS,
used by the FBI, for narrowing down the number of fingerprint records to be compared with an
unknown print. The latter are based in part on class characteristics (such as tented arch, left
slope loop, etc.), and present to the examiner a certain number of "presumptive" matches, which
the examiner than reviews to see if there is an actual match. The number of prints turned up by
AFIS depends on how many characteristics the fingerprint technician specifies for matching.
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The defenders of the thesis that no validation tests need be carried out on
fingerprint matching correctly point out that it was not with Daubert that the first
questioning of fingerprints occurred. Fingerprint matching has been questioned
and accepted for decades, with fingerprint technicians being cross-examined on
their techniques, their credentials, and their proficiency. Presumably, if the valida-
tion studies are carried out and the expected high success rate is verified, there will
be no more global attacks on the fingerprint technique. However, the case-by-case
inquiries will continue, with whatever insight into the sources of potential error
the validation studies provide. The alternative is to ignore the Daubert standard of
reliability when it comes to fingerprints and other long-standing techniques and
grandfather them in, creating a double standard. Attempts to allow fingerprint
evidence using the Daubert standard have resulted in some very strange reasoning
in judicial opinions, at least reasoning that seems strange to scientists and others
acquainted with the scientific method.
2. The Courts
No defense attorney has successfully argued that expert testimony based on
fingerprint evidence should be excluded because fingerprint matching in general
does not satisfy the Daubert standard. 163
The closest that the defense in a criminal case has come to success on a Daubert
motion to exclude a fingerprint expert from testifying that a match existed oc-
curred in United States v. Llera Plaza.164 Based on essentially the same argu-
ments for and against exclusion that had been raised a short time earlier in the
same court, 165 Judge Pollak ruled, in response to a defense motion, that the expert
fingerprint witness could only point out to the jury the similarities between the
latent print from the crime scene and that of the defendant. In other words, the
expert could not take the next step and declare a match; that was something for the
jury to decide. 166 In granting the defense motion, Judge Pollak indicated that he
knew what scientific validation studies were, and their value. 167 While taking
note of the uniqueness and permanence of fingerprints, he clearly contrasted sci-
entific validation tests of fingerprinting techniques with what the government at-
tomeys seemed to think they were, as reflected by their statement, '"[t]he ACE-V
process and the experts' conclusions have been tested empirically over a period of
100 years and in any particular case they can be tested by examination of the evi-
dence by another expert."' 168 Judge Pollak responded by stating:
The second clause of this sentence seems to be arguing that, following testimony
by one fingerprint examiner that a particular latent print corresponds with a par-
ticular known print, testimony by a second examiner constitutes a form of "test-
163. For a list of trials-including one in the federal court for the District of Maine--involv-
ing this issue, and a few appellate decisions, see Legal Challenges to Fingerprints, at http:/I
onin.coni/fp/daubert links.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
164. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *1-12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002).
165. United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
166. United States v. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305, at *18.
167. Id. at "19.
168. Id. at *9 (alterations in original) (quoting Government's Motion and Response at 112,
United States v. Llera Plaza, No. 98-362-10 2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002)).
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ing." However, this is not "testing" of the "theory" or the "technique" of finger-
print identification in the Daubert sense. With respect to "theory," the fact that a
second examiner, following the same "technique" as a prior examiner, reaches
the same (or, indeed, a different) result, would not seem to shed any light on the
validity of the "theory" underlying that "technique." With respect to "technique"-
assuming ... that the validity of the "theory" were acknowledged-it is difficult
to see that a single confirmatory examination would be adequate to validate the
"technique."... A scientist might be disposed to require scores, or perhaps hun-
dreds, of observations before regarding the "technique" as having been "tested."
t169
In addition, Judge Pollak noted that:
[T]he ACE-V process and the experts' conclusions have been tested empirically
over a period of 100 years-apparently refers to the fact that fingerprint identifi-
cation has been a customary ingredient of trials for a century .... "[A]dversarial"
testing in court is not, however, what the Supreme Court meant when it discussed
testing as an admissibility factor. 170
With these remarks Judge Pollak inherited a windstorm of protest. His well-pub-
licized ruling was the first time that many realized that Daubert might change the
whole landscape of scientific evidence. Months of legal commentary and newspa-
per editorials followed excoriating the decision, though not by and large from that
part of the scientific community that follows what is going on in the courts. Fol-
lowing the granting of the defense motion, the government moved for reconsidera-
tion, and two months later Judge Pollak reversed himself. 171 In essence, he said
that he had come to the realization that the fingerprint technique was not a science
needing to satisfy Daubert in the scientific context, but rather a specialty, which
had different measures of reliability. 172 Also reportedly playing a role in the change
of opinion was additional material placed into evidence regarding the proficiency
of FBI examiners. The ruling in favor of admitting expert testimony of fingerprint
examiners thus went only to FBI examiners, for whom, in Judge Pollak's view,
effective validation tests had been carried out, at least ones sufficient to establish
reliability for a specialty. 173 The opinion explaining why, "[i]n short, I have changed
my mind" also shows an alarming deference to the English system. 174 The fact
that the witness from Scotland Yard belittled the internal proficiency test used by
the FBI was far outweighed by his statement that Scotland Yard used the ACE-V
approach to fingerprint matching, just as the FBI did. 175
Although a great relief went across the land with Judge Pollak's reversal of
himself, the commentary regarding his logic was not all favorable among those
who took the trouble to read the opinion. In fact, to those involved in the scientific
enterprise, much of the recent case law on scientific evidence and associated legal
commentary seemed not just to reflect a difference of intellectual disciplines, but a
completely different logic system. This system recognizes a dichotomy between
"relevant evidence" and "reliable evidence," and holds that a judge can determine
169. United States v. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305, at *10.
170. Id. (alterations in original).
171. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 575-76 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
172. Id. at 563-64.
173. Id. at 565-66.
174. Id. at 576.
175. Id. at 575-76. To say that one uses the ACE-V approach says nothing about one's rate of
false positives.
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whether testimony will be helpful to the jury regardless of whether it is reliable.
Typical of the more outspoken remarks were those of David Faigman in the jour-
nal Science, under the heading "Science and the Law," 176 which were directed at
Judge Pollak's self-reversal and Judge Crow's decision in United States v. Cline:
177
Upon reflection, [Judge Pollak] said, he had come to the realization that finger-
print identification was not a matter of "science," it was a "specialization," and
thus need not meet the rigors of the scientific method [in order] to be admitted in
court. 178
In doubting the value of the scientific method as the touchstone by which
expert evidence is to be evaluated, judges like Pollak and Crow fail to say what
should replace it. Presumably, it is some combination of "years of personal ex-
perience" and general acceptance among members of some well-meaning guild.
... More troubling though, it reflects a basic misunderstanding of the subject of
empirical expertise....
Judge Crow's statement is remarkable for both its candor and its utter fail-
ure to appreciate the culture attending scientific testing of hypotheses. Science
does not "exist" categorically or in some concrete encyclopedia of knowledge
that passes muster by, say, some committee of the National Academies of Sci-
ence.... Courts make a fundamental error when they try to divide the world into
science and specialty categories. In truth, every expert who appears in court has
"specialized" knowledge of one sort or another. At best, it is specialized knowl-
edge based upon good applied science; at worst, it is specialized knowledge based
upon "years of personal experience." 179
In reversing the first decision, Judge Pollak was obligated to explain how
these factors were now met or why they were no longer relevant. Remarkably, he
stated, "I concluded in the January 7 opinion that Daubert's testing factor was not
met, and I have found no reason to depart from that conclusion." 180 Yet, some-
how, he now found that the other three factors mentioned in Daubert, error rate,
peer review and publication, and general acceptance, were satisfied. How this was
possible, without testing, is a great mystery of the decision. For him, this mystery
was solved by his observation that fingerprint identification, "is not, in my judg-
ment, itself a science." 181 He likened forensic scientists to "accountants, voca-
176. David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers? Sci. July 19, 2002, at 339.
177. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2002) (upholding the admission of expert testimony
regarding latent fingerprint matching despite acknowledging that the efficacy of such matching
has never been empirically validated).
178. Faigman, supra note 176, at 339.
179. Id. at 340.
180. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 at 564.
181. !d. at 560.
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tional experts, accident reconstruction experts, [and] appraisers of land or of art."'182
Forensic science was a specialty, not a science.
As is discussed in Section IV, the problem highlighted by the above passages
arises from the fact, unrecognized by Judges Pollak and Crow and others, that the
Daubert factors are not independent of one another. General acceptance follows
testing with favorable outcomes and peer-reviewed publications that are evaluated
by the community at large.
C. Voiceprints
1. The Science
Although the place of polygraphs in a review of scientific evidence is obvi-
ous, voiceprints also have a special place in the history of scientific evidence.
Today, more than one state has a rule for scientific evidence enunciated in the
course of a decision regarding admissibility of voiceprint testimony. Maine is one
of them, through State v. Williams183 in 1978, and California, through People v.
Kelly184 in 1976, is another. A more general factor that makes voiceprints interest-
ing in this context is that, in contrast to polygraph evidence, the courts have always
been divided on the admissibility of voiceprint evidence. (It is tempting to specu-
late on the contrast between Kelly placing California firmly in the Frye column as
it rejected voiceprint evidence, and Williams expressly rejecting Frye in Maine as
it upheld the admission of voiceprint evidence.) Also in contrast to polygraphs,
some of the supporters of voiceprint evidence come from solid academic and re-
search laboratory backgrounds.
A "voiceprint" is more accurately called a voice spectrograph (or spectro-
gram). It is a representation of an utterance of speech (or roar of a tiger), 185 laying
out as a function of time (on the x-axis) the frequencies contained in the utterance
(on the y-axis), and the loudness (indicated by the darkness of the tracing). In
other words, it is a graphical representation of loudness and frequency as a func-
tion of time. The voiceprint, with the quasi-ridges and whorls that this produces,
has some superficial comparison with a fingerprint. The "voiceprint" label arose
either because of this or the desire of the early developers to emphasize its indi-
vidualization powers by comparing it to fingerprints. Probably both.
182. Id. at 563. Interestingly, this tracks the words of Professor James Starrs, one of the
defense experts, following the first opinion. He suggested that fingerprint examiners should
give up the claim to science and say that they were just technicians. Adrian Cho makes note of
this:
In the meantime, James Starts, a law professor and forensic scientist at George Wash-
ington University in Washington, D.C., says that fingerprint examiners have a better
chance of satisfying the flexible Daubert standards by declaring fingerprint identifi-
cation a form of technical expertise, similar to accident reconstruction, rather than
science. But fingerprint examiners aren't willing to strike such a bargain, Wertheim
says. "That's the chicken's way out," he says. "We all feel that fingerprint identifica-
tion is good science."
Adrian Cho, Fingerprinting Doesn't Hold Up as a Science in Court, Sci., Jan. 18, 2002, at 418.
183. 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
184. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
185. See, e.g., HARv HOLLIEN, FORENSIC VOICE IDENTIFICATION 118 (2002).
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Unlike fingerprints, where the image reflects what is actually on a person's
fingers, with the quality of the representation varying only with the care with which
the fingerprints are made, voiceprints are technical constructs that take on qualita-
tively and quantitatively different appearances depending on how they are made.
One of the key variables when one is recording sound is the bandwidth1 86 of the
device that converts the sound wave into an electrical signal and, in particular, the
bandwidth of the filter at the input to that converter. 187 In order to get the most
faithful frequency reproduction, one needs to maximize the bandwidth. Unfortu-
nately, in an analogue to the Uncertainty Principle, the better defined the frequency,
the less well-defined the time variable. The point is that the voiceprint will have a
different appearance depending on the bandwidth at which it is collected.
Nevertheless, there are certain standard frequencies for making voiceprints.
In the context of speech, narrow-band is on the order of 45 Hz and broad band 300
Hz. 188 A typical voiceprint would be made from a low quality recording of a
telephone voice (demanding ransom, for example). At some point, that voiceprint
may be compared with voiceprints made of the voices of a number of suspects
uttering similar words. The use of the voiceprint for identification purposes takes
place in a combined "visual/aural" setting, where the voiceprints are reviewed by
a voiceprint expert while he/she is also listening to the voices of the known ones
and the unknown (criminal) one.
The issue, as far as scientific evidence admission is concerned, is whether
such an expert has a better record of voice identification or voice distinguishing
using the voiceprints than he/she (or any layperson, for that matter) does by just
listening to the voices. The consensus among scientists who are not directly in-
volved in the voiceprint field is that they probably do not, and that they definitely
do not improve their accuracy greatly by using the voiceprints as an adjunct to
simply listening. There is some evidence that to the extent that voiceprints help, it
is in the situation where a long time has elapsed between the making of the record-
ing of the unknown voice and those of the suspects. 189
Responding to the disputes about the value of voiceprints, the FBI requested
the National Research Council to evaluate them in the late 1970s. 190 This was
just after the California and Maine courts had dealt with them, in Kelly and Will-
iams, respectively, decisions referenced by the Committee doing the study. As
indicated by the title of the study, the Committee broadened the scope of the task
from the FBI's original request. As a result of the study, the FBI chose not to
introduce voiceprint evidence into court, but to continue to work with voiceprints
in background investigations.
186. Bandwidth is traditionally understood in physics and electrical engineering to mean the
range of frequencies involved. One can use it to refer, for example, to the frequency bandwidth
of an audio amplifier or to the frequency bandwidth over which a radio station is allowed to
transmit.
187. See COMM. ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L
ACADEMIES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION (1979) [hereinafter VOICE
IDENTIFICATION]; HOLLIEN, supra note 185, at 188.
188. Compare this with the bandwidth of good audio amplifiers, typically on the order of 50
kHz. Although most human speech has frequencies in the low hundreds of Hz as far as the
fundamental sound goes, other types of sound will, in general, include a wide range of pure
frequencies.
189. HOLLIEN, supra note 185, at 31.
190. See VOICE IDENTIFICATION, supra note 187.
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2. The Courts
The issue of whether voiceprints are acceptable scientific evidence is impor-
tant because if they are, an expert witness may testify to a voice identification that
would otherwise be left to a fact witness, to be evaluated ultimately by the jury.
For the party wishing the identification to be accepted by the jury, one more wit-
ness-especially an expert witness-testifying in support is usually an advantage.
At present, the state courts differ widely with respect to their receptivity to
expert testimony based on voiceprint. Interestingly, most of these cases came down
shortly before the National Research Council report. Of the states that have ad-
dressed the issue, eight upheld voiceprint admission, under a variety of standards, 19 1
and nine rejected voiceprints as not having adequate indicia of reliability. 192 Not
surprisingly, Wisconsin was in agreement with Maine in admitting voiceprints.
All but one of these seventeen decisions were pre-Daubert, the exception being
Alaska, which, in 1999, found voiceprints acceptable, in the case that expressly
switched Alaska from a strong Frye state to a Daubert state. 193
Of the eight states admitting voiceprints, four did so after the National Re-
search Council study on voice identification was published. Of the nine states
rejecting voiceprints, five did so after the study was published. So, no pattern
there either. This type of forensic evidence can be expected to produce volumes of
briefs in upcoming years. Again, it is noted that only one state has addressed the
question since Daubert.
Although most of the discussion of voiceprints and the courts has been fo-
cused on state courts, federal courts have also addressed this issue. For example,
the Fifth Circuit weighed in on this topic in United States v. Drones: 194
At the time of Drones's trial, four of our sister circuits had upheld the admis-
sibility of spectrographic evidence.... However, all of these cases were decided
before Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals .... No federal case decided
post-Daubert has considered the admissibility of expert voice identification tes-
timony.
In addition to the fact that the state of the law concerning expert voice iden-
tification was ambiguous, the expert testimony presented at the evidentiary hear-
ing demonstrates that spectrographic analysis is-and was at the time of Drones's
trial-of questionable scientific validity. Most notably, at the hearing, Koenig
testified that there is no proven theoretical basis for the basic underlying premise
that one person's voice is truly unique and therefore identifiable. He further
stated that this has resulted in a precipitous drop in the number of expert practi-
191. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1972);
State v. Williams 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Commonwealth v. Lyhus, 327 N.E.2d 671 (Mass.
1975); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 1971); State v. Williams, 446
N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1983); State v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382 (R.I. 1985); State v. Kendley, 433
N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 1988).
192. State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224 (Ariz. 1984); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal.
1976); Comet v. State, 450 N.E. 2d 498 (Ind. 1983); State v. Free, 493 So. 2d 781 (La. 1986);
Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1977); People v. Trobey, 257 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1977);
Windmere Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 522 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1987); People v. Jeter, 600 N.E.2d 214 (N.Y.
1992); Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977).
193. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999).
194. 218 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000).
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tioners over the past few decades, from fifty to sixty practitioners in the 1970's to
roughly a dozen experts at the time of Drones's trial. While Cain testified that
expert voice identification testimony has been used extensively in state and fed-
eral courts over the past thirty years, he also testified that he did not know if
spectrographic evidence was widely accepted by the relevant scientific commu-
nity. He also acknowledged that numerous factors-including a defendant's ability
to disguise his own voice-could affect the reliability of expert analysis. 195
The message is that the federal courts have yet to be heard from on voiceprints in
the post-Daubert era. On the one hand one could infer that if voiceprints were
admitted under the Frye standard, they would also be admitted under the Daubert
standard. Countering this, however, is the fact that voiceprints have gradually
fallen out of favor among the scientific community. This may, in fact, be an under-
statement. Consider:
[T]he use of "voiceprints" exploded upon the American scene in the 1960s. It
took years before the weight of the relevant research (plus court testimony by
scientists) demonstrated the harm "voiceprints" were bringing to law enforce-
ment and the courts. The misuses of the procedure now are obvious, as is the
damage that has been done by their use .... "[V]oiceprints".. have become but
a "footprint" in history. 196
D. Handwriting Identification
1. The Science
With respect to identification techniques, the Daubert bell tolled for hand-
writing matches before it did so for fingerprinting and, so far, with more far-reach-
ing results. Probably this was due to the fact that while we all have an ability to
recognize handwriting-again a pattern-recognition skill-and in fact use this ability
throughout our lifetimes, it is the rare person who could recognize his own finger-
print. Thus, the suggestion that experts in handwriting comparison might not have
anything to offer that a layperson did not already have seemed reasonable.
It is true that persons who study handwriting have a formalism that is avail-
able for characterizing a specimen of handwriting when called upon to compare
with another specimen, and may be more alert to superficial variations that occur
in one's writing with time. The question being asked is whether the expert then
can go beyond pointing out similarities and show how certain differences may not
be sufficient to preclude the conclusion that two specimens were written by the
same person. This is exactly the same question that was posed in Judge Pollak's
two opinions regarding fingerprint experts. 197
195. Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
196. HOLLIEN, supra note 185, at 25.
197. See supra Part tII.B.
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In some ways, however, the attack on the expertise of handwriting identifica-
tion has anticipated the pattern of attack on latent fingerprint identification. Most
of the motions to exclude the handwriting expert from testifying as to the identity
of the writer have been rejected, and the rejections upheld on appeal. On the other
hand, there have been some courts that have accepted the arguments (1) that there
has never been any study to show the uniqueness over time of handwriting pat-
terns; and (2) that an expert in the field is no better at identifying unknown hand-
writing specimens than a layperson. As a consequence, there are efforts on many
fronts to provide the data necessary to address those questions or to remedy the
deficiencies. The FBI is conducting a study aimed at a statistical analysis of hand-
writing characteristics, and has sought volunteers with flyers which said:
The validity of handwriting comparisons has been challenged in court under
Daubert since 1995. Due to the scarcity of published research in this area, the
forensic document community has struggled to meet these requirements. This
collection of handwriting samples [being solicited] will provide a sound basis for
judicial decisions regarding the admissibility of this type of evidence. 19 8
People who answered the call were asked to produce seriatim five cursive copies
of a paragraph followed by five printed copies of the same paragraph, using a total
of ten pieces of paper. Volunteers had been told that this would take as long as an
hour, but most people finished in about half that time. 199
2. The Courts
Typical of the small number of decisions rejecting testimony by handwriting
experts is United States v. Hidalgo.200 The court held that in light of Daubert
198. This was written on a flyer distributed at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the AAFS. Note
also in this regard the recent paper reporting on the use of computer algorithms to analyze the
characteristics of handwriting samples from 1500 volunteers. Two types of comparisons were
tested. The first involved the use of a computer algorithm to match an "unknown" writing with
one of a set of known writings containing a contribution from the "unknown" writer. Correct
identification was made in approximately 98% of the cases. The second task was to determine
whether two specific documents were written by the same person (with no effort to identify that
person). This task resulted in about 96% accuracy. Impressive as these results seem with re-
spect to the potential for automated handwriting identification, its significance is undercut by
the size and number of the handwriting samples used. Each volunteer copied a 156-word pas-
sage three times. Not surprisingly, the accuracy in identification increased with the size of the
specimens compared, and decreased with the number of known samples being compared. Thus,
the 98% accuracy figure was the result of performing the identification task in which a sample
of only two writers was used, each of whom had provided three writing samples. One of these
six samples was randomly selected as the "questioned" writing specimen, and compared against
the remaining five. When the task conditions were changed so that a smaller portion of the
questioned specimens was compared against a larger pool of possible writers, the accuracy de-
creased considerably. The accuracy of the second task (that of determining whether two docu-
ments were written by the same person) were similarly dependent upon the size of the writing
specimen that was analyzed. While this study does not provide validation of the performance of
human document examiners, it does take a much-needed step toward establishing a quantitative
method of classifying handwriting characteristics. S. N. Snhari et al., Individuality of Hand-
writing, 47 J. FORENSIC ScL. 856 (2002).
199. April A. Yergin, personal communication. Ms. Yergin was one of the volunteers, and
commented that the effort tended to leave volunteers with sore hands, suggesting that the ap-
pearance of the writing may have varied just within the hour or so of the tests.
200. 229 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002).
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there was insufficient scientific backing for the proposition that each person's hand-
writing was unique.20 1 For this reason, the court excluded the proffered expert
from identifying key handwriting as that of the defendant.202 The court appar-
ently did not address the more interesting question, namely whether the expert was
better than a layperson in comparing two handwriting specimens. This part of the
question did not bother the court, which was only concerned with the uniqueness
issue.
E. Bullet "Fingerprinting"
1. The Science
Bullet "fingerprinting" by trace-element analysis is very interesting in the
present context. It seems to be a technique that has been used repeatedly (sub-
jected to the "adversarial testing" of a trial) without ever having been subjected to
a validation test. Now, it appears that, at the very least, it has been overempha-
sized as a means of identification.
For more than thirty years, it had been thought and taught by police investiga-
tors and particularly by the FBI that every batch of lead bullets that is manufac-
tured has a slightly different chemical composition from every other batch, and
that that difference is measurable. This meant that by carrying out trace-element
analysis on a bullet found at a crime scene, a bullet "fingerprint" could be devel-
oped for comparison with bullets in the possession of a suspect. 203 In recent years,
the profile has been based on the concentrations (usually in parts per million) of
six elements: antimony, tin, arsenic, copper, bismuth, and silver.204
The goal of prosecutors in using the forensic evidence developed from trace-
element analysis of bullets is to be able to emphasize the unlikelihood that the
match in profiles between the crime scene bullet and the bullets in the defendant's
possession is purely coincidental. The legitimacy of this emphasis is, in part, in-
versely proportional to the number of bullets coming from a batch of lead that does
not display a significant change in the trace-element profile. This theory can be
rendered completely without value if the same profile exists in more than one
batch.
The history of the trace-element analysis technique over the past three de-
cades has included expert testimony from FBI agents that a given profile is limited
to bullets in a single box of cartridges 205 or were all manufactured on or about the
same day.206 In a pattern that is frustratingly common, this type of testimony
201. id. at 967-68.
202. Id.
203. Charles Piller & Robin Mejia, Science Casts Doubt on FBI's Bullet Evidence, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at Al.
204. See, e.g., Robert D. Koons & Diana M. Grant, Compositional Variation in Bullet Lead
Manufacture, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 950 (2002); Erik Randich et al., A Metallurgical Review of the
Interpretation of Bullet Lead Compositional Analysis, 127 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 174 (2002); Ernest
R. Peele et al., Comparison of Bullets Using the Elemental Composition of the Lead Component,
PROCEEDINGS OF TIE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE FORENSIC ASPECTS OF TRACE EVIDENCE, June
24-28, 1991, at 57.
205. Randich, supra note 204, at 175.
206. State v. Behn, 753 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 2000).
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continued to be elicited and remained instrumental in convictions, even after ar-
ticles began to appear in refereed forensic science literature indicating that it rep-
resented a gross exaggeration. 207 Furthermore, long before such articles began
appearing, certain FBI crime laboratory scientists had their doubts regarding the
individualizing power of the trace-element analysis technique. 208
Although it could be argued technically that first validation tests were not of
sufficient statistical weight to cause the technique to be abandoned abruptly, they
should have led to more caution in testifying to the degree of individualization
implied by the tests. Then, in 2002, a blockbuster of a paper on the subject was
published that had, as one of its four authors, a scientist recently retired from the
FBI.209 This paper, A Metallurgical Review of the Interpretation of Bullet Lead
Compositional Analysis (referred to here as RDMT, after the initials of its authors'
surnames), first recounts the history of the trace-element method and the fact that
there had never been any validation studies. The authors note:
[One expert] has concluded from his study of a small number of bullets that in
general bullet lead analysis does not generate individualizing information. How-
ever other forensic examiners have continued to conclude that positive associa-
tion can be made between bullets associated with a suspect and those from a
crime scene. The only published rationale purported to provide a foundation for
these conclusions is that "if two bullets are produced from the same homoge-
neous source of lead, then they will have analytically indistinguishable composi-
tion."2 10
The RDMT then describes the authors' study of the chemical composition of
many years of lead smelting to produce material for ammunition.2 11 They con-
clude from these studies that bullets produced years apart could have trace-ele-
ment profiles indistinguishable from one another and that bullets from the same
"source" of lead could have profiles distinguishable from one another. 2 12 In addi-
tion, they discuss the entire process of ammunition manufacture, from the prepara-
tion of the lead alloy to the final production of bullets, and suggest that this shows
that the entire premise of the individualization of bullets and the idea of bullet
"fingerprints" was misbegotten in the first place. They conclude:
Based on the inhomogeneities observed in lead "sources," and of numerous dem-
onstrated instances of multiple sources that are analytically indistinguishable, it
is our conclusion that the most positive opinion that can be rendered from data
that show that two or more bullets or fragments are analytically indistinguishable
is that they "could have," or that "it is possible" that they had, a common source.
Our literature review and research suggest that no valid statistical probability or
likelihood can be attached to a conclusion of "same source of molten lead" or
"same box of ammunition," even if pressed by the proponent of the evidence or
the court.2 13
One might expect that the RDMT validation study will be criticized by advo-
cates of the technique on the grounds that its authors did not make any measure-
207. See, e.g., Raymond 0. Keto, Analysis and Comparison of Bullet Leads by Inductively-
Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1020 (1999).
208. Piller & Mejia, supra note 203, at Al.
209. Randich et al., supra note 204.
210. Id. at 175 (emphasis added) (quoting Peele et al., supra note 204, at 57-68).
211. Id. at 176-79.
212. Id. at 176.
213. Id. at 191.
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ments themselves, 214 and that, in any event, data on the source lead may not be
dispositive of the issue, since the bullet manufacturing process itself may intro-
duce inhomogeneities with individualizing potential. Indeed, three months fol-
lowing the publication of the RDMT paper, a report coming from the FBI's Foren-
sic Science Research Unit appeared in the Journal of Forensic Science asserting
that as a particular batch ("source") of lead proceeds through the multi-step bullet-
manufacturing process. 2 15 It stated:
the size of an individual homogeneous melt of lead decreases as more distinct
compositions are formed as a result of remelting and mixing of sources, includ-
ing lead scrap ... [leading to] at least 10 compositionally distinguishable groups
of bullet wire in a 19.7-h period. The largest group could potentially be used to
produce a maximum of 1.3 million compositionally indistinguishable 40 grain
bullets.
21 6
While different profiles can arise from the same batch of starting lead, these find-
ings do suggest that there is a potential for some individualization because of indi-
vidual profiles that are constant across small portions of the batch at the conclu-
sion of manufacturing. Thus, to the extent that these findings can be generalized,
it is suggested that a statement, modified from what has been testified to in the
past, may be made about individualizing of bullets by their trace-element profile.
However, this study does not address the possibility of bullets with indistinguish-
able profiles coming from completely different original batches.
The FBI has recently requested that the National Research Council undertake
a detailed evaluation of the trace- element analysis technique.2 17 The study, titled
"Scientific Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition Comparison," is
described as follows:
An ad hoc committee administered by the Board on Chemical Sciences and Tech-
nology will assess the validity of the scientific basis for the use of elemental
composition determination to compare lead alloy-based items of evidence. The
following three areas will be addressed:
>Analytical method. Is the method analytically sound? What are the
relative merits of the methods currently available? Is the selection of
elements used as comparison parameters appropriate? Can additional
useful information be gained by measurement of isotopic compositions?
>Statistics for comparison. Are the statistical tests used to compare
two samples appropriate? Can known variations in compositions intro-
duced in manufacturing processes be used to model specimen group-
ings and provide improved comparison criteria?
>Interpretation issues. What are the appropriate statements that can be
made to assist the requester [that is, the FBI] in interpreting the results
of compositional bullet lead comparison, both for indistinguishable and
distinguishable compositions? Can significance statements be modi-
214. In part, this was because of the ready availability of data regarding trace-element con-
centrations in the sources. They note that not all of the trace metals found in the bullet profile
are impurities, but rather that some are deliberately added in controlled amounts. Id. at 177.
215. Koons & Grant, supra note 204.
216. Id. at 950.
217. The Current Projects System, The Nat'l Academies, at http:www.nas.edu/webcr.nsf/
ProjectScopeDisplayfBCST-L-02-03-A? OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
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fled to include effects of such factors as the analytical technique, manu-
facturing process, comparison criteria, specimen history, and legal re-
quirements? 218
This sounds like what is needed to determine whether there should be "general
scientific acceptance" of this technique. Depending on the outcome of the study,
there may be many petitions for post-conviction relief, so effective has the trace-
element analysis seemed to be in producing guilty verdicts.
2. The Courts
It is obviously too soon for the latest findings to be reflected in the courts, let
alone in appellate decisions. However, consider State v. Noel,2 19 a 1997 New Jer-
sey appellate decision as an indication of how the trace-element analysis technique
may have been used beyond its known range of validity. In this particular case, it
was not the expert witness who was criticized for misstating or exaggerating the
individualizing ability of the trace-element analysis, but rather the prosecutor, for
the manner in which he characterized his expert's testimony.220 The testimony in
toto indicated that hundreds of thousands of 9mm bullets could have the same
profile, having come from the same batch of lead alloy used in the bullet manufac-
ture.22 1 The court found that without being able to testify to the total number of
bullets that would have the same profile, and the patterns of distribution of the
bullets from the particular batch, there was inadequate foundation for the expert's
testimony to be more probative than prejudicial. 222 The court criticized the
prosecution's closing statement, where he seemed to imply (with phrases like
"unique as a snow flake," harking back to the analogy made of actual fingerprints)
that the similarity of the profile that was found had more significance than it did.223
The most interesting facts in Noel come from the dissenting judge's opinion,
which revealed that there were nine bullets in the defendant's possession and six
from the crime scene that were tested, and that these fifteen bullets were found to
display five different profiles.224 One would think that this distribution in itself
would have raised questions about the basic premise of bullet matching using trace-
element analysis.
Although the verdict was reversed in Noel on grounds related to the trace-
element analysis, the Noel court was satisfied that there was general scientific
acceptance of the basic technique.225 This was five years before it became clear
that the technique had never been validated in a manner having statistical signifi-
cance. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions over the previous twenty-
four years that had accepted the trace-element analysis as acceptable scientific
evidence. 226
218. The Current Projects System, at htp://www.nas.edu/weber.nsf/ProjectScopeDisplay/
BCST-L-02-03-A?OpenDocument.
219. 697 A.2d 157 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
220. Id. at 161.
221. Id,
222. Id. at 164-65.
223. Id. at 165.
224. Id. at 167.
225. Id. at 162.
226. ld.
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In June 2003, an FBI chemist pled guilty to perjury in pretrial testimony of-
fered in connection with a Kentucky murder trial in 2002.227 In particular, she
stated that the bullets found in the possession of the defendant and at the murder
scene were manufactured in a process that resulted in no more than 280,000 bul-
lets per batch with the same profile and the same bullet fingerprint. 228 When a
witness from the bullet manufacturer contradicted that statement, the chemist ad-
mitted that she had lied, and that the number in question should have been in the
tens of millions.229 She was quoted as blaming her conduct on a sense of crisis in
her work, fed by "new and repeated challenges to the validity of the science asso-
ciated with bullet lead comparison analysis." 230 It is reasonable to conclude that
the "new and repeated challenges" arose because of Daubert.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: DAUBERT FACTORS REDUCED TO
THEIR WORKABLE ESSENCE ARE ESSENTIALLY THE FRYE STANDARD
The Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,231 was careful to say that
the measure of admissibility of expert testimony was reliability and not the degree
to which it matched up with any particular list of reliability indicia. In Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael,232 the Court explicitly stated that Rule 702 applied to all expert
opinion testimony, regardless of whether it was scientific. This sent the message
that, as the nature of the testimony departed further from what might be considered
a scientific or technical field, the types of things considered in assessing reliability
could be very different from the factors set out in Daubert. However, this Article
is about expert testimony relating to scientific evidence. When it comes to evaluating
scientific evidence under Daubert, the strong tendency of the courts is to "check
off" the Daubert factors in the same manner that courts dealing with likelihood of
confusion in trademark infringement cases tick off the DuPont factors. 233 It is
therefore important for a court to look more closely at the Daubert factors, which
would reveal that expert scientific testimony does not always meet this standard.
When proffered scientific evidence is implicitly or explicitly awarded "merit
points" based on how it satisfies each of the Daubert factors, the balance is shifted
toward admitting unreliable testimony into evidence, the degree of shift depending
on exactly how the factors are articulated. To see why this is so, refer to the Sec-
tion III listing of Daubert factors, a configuration typical of those appearing in
"Daubert hearing" decisions. With a little reflection, one can see that the first of
those factors lacks any practical significance and therefore provides no guidance
at all for evaluating proffered scientific evidence. As will be set out below, two
other factors are effectively redundant, and therefore lead to double counting if
considered separately, compounding the error of considering the first factor at all.
In sum, three of the Daubert factors are logically tantamount to a single one, namely
(c) whether the technique has a reasonable error rate. After the following discus-
sion, a suggested form for the combined factor will be given.
227. Mark Pitsch, Ex-FBI Scientist Pleads Guilty, COURIER-J. (Louisville), June 18, 2003 § B.
228. Piller & Mejia, supra note 203.
229. id.
230. Id.
231. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
232. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
233. In re E. . DuPont DeNernours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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Factor (a), whether the technique is testable and tested, is nearly always cited
by courts explaining their Daubert analyses, is without practical significance. To
award a technique points just because it is testable is absurd. The fact that testabil-
ity is even alluded to in Daubert probably results from the deep philosophical
waters through which Justice Blackmun swam beside Karl Popper. Indeed, much
of the discussion in Daubert going to just what is "science" reflects such a swim. 234
The message of that discussion is that before one can evaluate the reliability of
something proffered as scientific evidence, one must check to see whether it meets
the definition of science as popularized by the now largely discredited theories of
Popper regarding how science is "done."'235 Those contributions of Popper to the
general discourse that have not been discredited are obvious to most persons who
reflect on them and were recently summed up by Martin Gardner, who said, "I
believe that Popper's reputation was based mainly on his persistent but misguided
efforts to restate common-sense views in a novel language that is rapidly becom-
ing out of fashion." 236 Nevertheless, Popper did contribute to many non-scientists
the idea that the essence of a scientific theory was that it was testable, even though
he expressed this by saying that it had to be "falsiflable."
One quickly finds, when devising examples that are not testable, that applying
the "testability" criterion to proffered scientific testimony is not a very good use of
one's time. One example of a non-testable theory would be one that depended on
variables that could not be observed directly or indirectly (sometimes called "hid-
den variables"). For example, in place of the present atomic theory based on quan-
tum mechanics and various interaction forces between sub-atomic particles, one
might propose that all observed atomic behavior was due to tiny, tiny creatures,
forever undetectable by any means, controlling the electrons and nuclei. For every
objection that could be raised (such as the impossibility of sentient creatures smaller
than the hydrogen nucleus), an ad hoc, untestable explanation would be offered.
It is, in fact, quite difficult to think of a theory of anything that is not testable
in a statistically acceptable manner. In contrast, it is easy to list really bizarre
theories that are testable, and therefore scientific. In 1955, the list included the
theory that the moon was covered with miles-thick dust which would swallow
anything landing on its surface. 237 It could have also included the theory that the
moon was shaped like a giant carrot, with its pointy end always facing away from
234. In fairness to Justice Blackmun, it is noted that more than one of the amici curiae
indulged themselves in philosophical discussions that went far astray. Therein undoubtedly lay
Justice Blackmun's infatuation with Popper and his theories.
235. Popper became obsessed with the idea that scientific work is an attempt to "falsify"
scientific theories. Essentially no scientific work is so directed, though some results may be
inconsistent with a theory and if enough inconsistencies arise and another theory is available,
the first theory will be discarded. See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 35.
236. Martin Gardner, A Skeptical Look At Karl Popper, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, No. 4, 2001, at
13. The major complaint about Popper, which was raised decades ago, is that he claimed that
science consisted of attempts to falsify conjectures, whereas normal scientific work assumed
that results consistent with theory will be obtained. The falsification that does occur arises from
the normal course of work rather than an attempt to falsify. Furthermore, as Kuhn has pointed
out, a theory is not simply "falsified" even if a valid experimental result is inconsistent with that
theory. See generally KUHN, supra note 35.
237. This was a theory advanced by the respected astrophysicist Gerard Kuiper (1905-1973),
who in addition to publishing it in the professional literature, presented it in a symposium at the
University of Chicago in 1957, attended by this author.
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the earth. Continuing with the moon, another testable theory yet to be tested is that
the moon has green cheese at its core or that it contains an underground civiliza-
tion of proto-humans. The point is that requiring a theory to be "testable" does not
really eliminate anything; in particular, it is highly unlikely that it would eliminate
anything proposed as scientific testimony. Testability is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition, and to list it as one of a small number of guides to reliability is to
dilute the inquiry into reliability. Furthermore, although the factor has been listed
above as "testable and has been tested," many courts devote text to just the simple
"testable" factor.
Of course, the phrase "and has been tested" does not add anything to the value
of the factor as a measure of reliability. So what if it has been tested! It might have
failed, given ambiguous results, or shown itself to be in other ways undependable.
And yet, again, one sees judicial decisions awarding admissibility points to a fo-
rensic technique because it has been tested. It is submitted that the only testing-
related attribute that contributes anything to gauging the reliability of a theory or
technique is that of having been adequately tested and found to be accurate. De-
pending on the particular type of testimony involved, this can be stated in any one
of a number of ways.
Factor (d), the "standards" factor is also, in general, superfluous. In order for
a technique to be tested in a way that is significant, there must be some standard
manner of performing the technique. It would, however, be useful, in connection
with the technique's particular application that is before the court, to ask whether
the applicable standards had been complied with.
In terms of scientific and legal logic, three of the five "factors" listed above
collapse into a single factor stated in terms of a value assessment. In keeping with
the form used by Daubert, it can be stated as:
Have statistically valid tests of the theory
(technique, etc.) shown it to be accurate?
Note that the plural "tests" is used. As far as scientists are concerned, if the answer
to that question is in the negative, that is as far as one goes.
How do scientists learn about new theories and techniques and their valida-
tions? By the refereed scientific literature. This does not mean that new theories
and techniques published in the refereed literature (Factor (b)) automatically be-
come accepted. 238 It is only when the scientific community can conclude that the
answer to the question regarding accuracy is in the affirmative that this acceptance
occurs. Therefore, though having one's theory published in the refereed literature
indicates that it is more than just "junk science" dreamed up for the trial in ques-
tion, publication by itself does not establish reliability.
In summary, the Daubert factors, when applied logically to proffered forensic
testimony, reduce to the following:
Does the technique on which the testimony is based
have the general acceptance of the scientific community?
In cases where the technique is of such a nature that the breadth of the scientific
community familiar with it may be small, one may add:
238. It generally does mean, however, that the discoveries are worth reading about. The goal
of the referees is to eliminate the articles that, as Pauli famously said, are so bad that they are not
even wrong.
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Have statistically valid tests of the theory
(technique, etc.) shown it to be accurate?
Expert testimony from a witness educated in statistics (there are more of those
around than one might think) would generally be all that is necessary to resolve the
latter question.
There has been a great deal of discussion in the legal and scientific communi-
ties since Daubert about the use of "court's experts" under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706. Although there has been a marked reluctance by both the plaintiffs' bar
and the defense bar to see this suggestion get very far, there may be much less
reluctance to allow the testimony of a Rule 706 expert that is limited to evaluating
the statistical significance of proffered validation tests.239
Scientific evaluations of the polygraph show why one of the major complaints
about the "general acceptance" guideline of Daubert is invalid. The complaint is
that one cannot assess general acceptance without first determining what the ap-
propriate scientific community is, and that whether or not the technique in ques-
tion is found to have general acceptance depends on which community one looks
to. This is missing the point; it is usually the entire scientific community to which
one can look for the existence of consensus regarding a particular theory or tech-
nique. The National Research Council studies identified in this Article provide
one illustration of why this is so. 240 Notwithstanding the fact that science is a
highly complex enterprise comprised of specialized working communities, whose
members are generally unable to converse with one another about the substance of
their respective work, there remains a unifying bond among scientists, a universal
language. That bond and language are strengthened by their scientific approach to
the physical world, an approach that enables most scientists to understand and
assess validation studies regardless of the specialty to which the studies refer. Such
assessment is, in fact, probably what scientists as a group are best at.
Furthermore, not only are they able to detect the weak element or fatal failing
in validation studies underlying bootless claims and theories, most can articulate
in non-scientific terms the rationale for their conclusions. The reason why this can
be done across community borders is because the evaluation is basically proce-
dural, just as it is, for example, when a jurist evaluates the fairness of a trial or
other legal procedure. Consequently, "general acceptance" really means general
acceptance by the entire scientific community, an acceptance that can be gauged
by existing literature or by requesting a group such as the National Research Council
to determine it.
Finally, in view of the stakes that are presented by the exclusion or admission
of forensic testimony, and the interpretation that is given to that which is admitted,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how a criminal defendant can receive a fair
trial, or a criminal defense attorney prepare a reasonable defense, without there
being forensic resources available to the defense. So important is this point, as can
be seen from just a review of the history of bullet "fingerprint" analysis, that it
would seem that no criminal trial should be permitted to go forward without the
defense having acquired broad technical assistance in dealing with the prosecution's
239. A program to assist in Rule 706 experts has been initiated by the AAAS, assisted by the
AAFS and other scientific organizations under the sponsorship of the NIJ. However, three years
into its existence, the provided experts number in the single digits.
240. See supra Part ILI.A.
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expert witnesses and forensic sciences. There is little doubt that trial courts in
Maine already strongly discourage defense attorneys from proceeding without such
assistance.24 1 Defense attorneys should be barred from doing so, and sanctioned
for failure to be ready to proceed if they have not obtained such assistance by the
day scheduled for trial.
241. See, for example, the transcript of the pre-trial hearing in State v. Crawford, CR-00397
(Me. Super. Ct., Pen. Cty.), in which the defendant was charged with arson. The trial judge
repeatedly queried the defense's decision not to consult a fire expert before the case went to
trial. The prosecutor also questioned this decision, citing the likelihood that a guilty verdict
would be appealed on this ground, given that the prosecution case turned largely on testimony
by the prosecution's own fire investigators. Subsequently, after serving a term in prison, the
defendant petitioned for post-conviction relief based on his loss of opportunity to have a foren-
sic expert. A decision, issued on September 2, 2003, denied the petition based on the court's
finding that Mr. Crawford had knowingly waived his right to expert assistance in the pre-trial
exchange in which he personally took part. Crawford v. State, CR-02-882 (Me. Super. Ct., Pen.
Cty., Sept. 2, 2003) (Hjelm, J.).
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